bepress university libraries

DigitalCommons@bepress
NIU Test
9-15-2008

Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of Protection: How Easing
Access to Judicial Process Has Eased the Possibility for Abuse of
the Process
David H. Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test

Recommended Citation
Taylor, David H., "Ex Parte Domestic Violence Orders of Protection: How Easing Access to Judicial
Process Has Eased the Possibility for Abuse of the Process" (2008). NIU Test. 1722.
https://testing.bepress.com/niu_test/1722

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@bepress. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NIU Test by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@bepress.

+(,121/,1(

Citation: 18 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 83 2008-2009
Provided by:
Available Through: David C. Shapiro Memorial Law Library, NIU Colleg

Content downloaded/printed from
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Wed Jun 29 16:38:18 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?
&operation=go&searchType=0
&lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=1055-8942

EX PARTE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORDERS OF
PROTECTION:
HOW EASING ACCESS TO JUDICIAL PROCESS HAS EASED
THE POSSIBILITY FOR ABUSE OF THE PROCESS
David H. Taylor*
Maria V. Stoilkov**
DanielJ.Greco***
I. INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence is a pervasive problem in today's society.' The
number of incidents of abuse is staggering. 2 Nevertheless, prior to the
enactment of domestic violence statutes beginning in the 1970's, judicial
process was largely unavailable to victims as a practical remedy due to power
and economic differences, as well as the slow speed with which the wheels of
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1. COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & SEXUAL ASSAULT, AN ANNUAL REPORT TO
GOVERNOR WALTER J. HICKEL & THE ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE. 2 (1992) ("A woman is
beaten every 18 seconds and 4,000 battered women are killed every year in the United States.
Nationwide, more than one million abused women each year seek medical assistance for injuries
caused by battering. In Alaska, 26% of adult women have been physically abused by a spouse
sometime during their lives and most of the battered women were abused at least once a month.
It is estimated that a minimum of 13,200 women living in Alaska have required medical treatment
by a doctor or hospital for injuries sustained by abuse at some time in their life. In 1990, fifty
percent of female murder victims in Alaska were killed by their husbands or boyfriends. More
than half of all homeless women are on the street because they are fleeing domestic violence.
There are nearly three times as many animal shelters in the United States as there are battered
women shelters.").
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CENTS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, INCIDENCE, PREVALENCE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES
19
(2003),
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv-cost/IPVBook-Final-Febl 8.pdf
("Nearly 5.3 million intimate partner victimizations occur among U.S. women ages 18 and older

each year. This violence results in nearly 2.0 million injuries and nearly 1,300 deaths.")
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justice turn. 3 In recognition, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
enacted some form of statutory relief for victims of domestic violence. 4 These
statutes largely employ a common, two-stage scheme. 5 First, a victim of
domestic violence may obtain an emergency ex parte order of limited duration.
These temporary orders grant various forms of relief, such as a prohibition of
contact with the victim, exclusion from a shared residence, a prohibition of
removing possessions from the residence, and physical care and custody of the
parties' children. 6 After notice to the alleged abuser, a full hearing is held
within a relatively short period of time at which the alleged abuser may appear
and defend the action. 7 An order of longer duration may then be entered;

3. Traditional legal responses to domestic violence include the civil remedies of tort and
criminal actions, both of which are time-consuming and require, as a practical matter,
professional legal assistance. Inter-spousal immunity historically presented a bar to victims'
pursuit of even these remedies. See FREDERICA L. LEHRMAN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (West Group 2007) (providing a synopsis of intentional tort, negligence, and
criminal actions available to victims of domestic violence); Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for
Protection:Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 157, 160-63 (2003) (describing
civil remedies of injunction and divorce and the ways in which these remedies are inadequate to
provide prompt relief to a victim); see also Magness v. Magness, 558 A.2d 807, 808-09 (Md.
1989) (examining the "evolution of injunctions in divorce, alimony, and annulment cases in
Maryland" as the Maryland court's equity power to grant injunctions in domestic cases expanded
through case law and statute from 1846 through 1977, and noting that "[tihe use of ex parte
injunctions in domestic cases became well accepted and frequently used [after 1942].").
4. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protectionfor Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801, 810 (1993) ("Currently all
fifty states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico make civil protection orders available to
victims of domestic violence."); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-101 (West 2004) ("The
General Assembly . . . finds that this [statute] shall meet a compelling societal need and is
necessary to correct the acute and pervasive problem of violence and abuse within households in
this state."); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/102(3) (West 1999) (stating that one of the
underlying purposes of the Domestic Violence Act is to "[r]ecognize that the legal system has
ineffectively dealt with family violence in the past .... ").
5. See generally Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence
Cases: An EmpiricalAssessment ofthe Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L 163,
165-66 (1993) (noting that reform statutes "typically create a two-step process for obtaining an
order of protection.").
6. Klein & Orloff, supra note 4, at 1031-44. For clarity, this article will use the term "ex
parte order of protection" for general references to the ex parte order; however, footnotes and
other references to specific sources will use the term contained in the source.
7. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/222(c) (West Supp. 2008) ("Unless respondent
was present in court when the order was issued, the sheriff, other law enforcement official or
special process server shall promptly serve that order upon respondent and file proof of such
service, in the manner provided for service of process in civil proceedings."); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 60/221 (b)(4) (West Supp. 2008) ("An order of protection shall further state ... [t]he
date, time and place for any scheduled hearing for extension of that order of protection or for
another order of greater duration or scope."); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/221(b)(6) (West
Supp. 2008) ("For emergency and interim orders of protection, that respondent may petition the
court ... to re-open that order if he or she did not receive actual prior notice of the hearing ...
and alleges that he or she had a meritorious defense to the order or that the order or any of its
remedies was not authorized by this Act."). See also Kinports & Fischer, supra note 5.
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commonly one to two years is entered.8
Emergency ex parte relief is an effective weapon in the arsenal available
to combat domestic violence. 9 By affording a victim the opportunity to obtain
judicial relief without notice, that person can seek to extricate herself from the
circumstance of violence, free from fear that further violence would be
precipitated by notice to the abuser. When an actual victim of domestic
l
violence seeks ex parte relief, the propriety of this remedy is unassailable.
Therefore, statutory schemes have sought to ease the ability of a person to
afford herself of such relief.11 Nevertheless, as the doors of the courthouse
8. E.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(e)(1) (West 1998) ("Any final protection order or approved
consent agreement shall be for a period of one year unless a shorter or longer period of time is
expressly ordered by the court."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 4007(2) (West Supp. 200708) ("A protective order or approved consent agreement is for a fixed period not to exceed [two]
years."); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025(a) (Vernon 2002) ("[A]n order under this subtitle is
effective (1) for the period stated in the order, not to exceed two years; or (2) if a period is not
stated in the order, until the second anniversary of the date the order was issued.").
9. Studies have measured the effectiveness of ex parte orders of protection using various
criteria. While there seems to be no authoritative measurement of the effectiveness of the ex
parte order of protection, the evidence available indicates that ex parte orders of protection have
been effective for most victims in that the order of protection has succeeded in reducing the
obstacles to judicial protection. See, e.g., SUSAN KEILITZ & PAULA L. HANNAFORD, BENEFITS
AND LIMITATIONS OF CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE, DENVER, COLORADO, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NATIONAL
(1995),
DATA
JUSTICE
CRIMINAL
OF
ARCHIVE

http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/02557.xml (finding that, in most cases,
civil protection orders increase the victim's sense of well-being and deter repeated physical or
psychological abuse); Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do RestrainingOrders Help? Battered
Women 's Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 227, 245 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,

1992) (finding that temporary restraining orders are generally effective in empowering women to
end abusive relationships); Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on
Lawyers andJudges to ProtectBattered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 499, 509
(2003) (citing a 1999-2000 study conducted in Baltimore that indicated a "substantial number" of
study respondents found "'filing for a protective order' a helpful strategy" in increasing their
safety and well-being). Cf Carolyn N. Ko, Note, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic
Violence: The Unresolved Question of "Efficacy," 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 368-78 (2002)
(arguing that many existing studies regarding the effectiveness of civil restraining orders are
methodologically flawed.).
10. Throughout the article I have used the pronoun "she" in reference to victims of domestic
violence. There are, of course, male victims as well. Nevertheless, because abuse of females by
males is most prevalent, I have used the female pronouns.
11. Ease may be considered in two contexts: one, easing relief in the sense of increasing
the number of remedies available and, two, in the sense of the ease with which the remedies may
be obtained. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 4 (explaining that legal reforms have created a
"broad array" of remedies for battered women); see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6302 (West
2006) ("It is the intent of the legislature to expand the ability of the courts to assist victims by
providing a legal means for victims of domestic violence to seek protection orders to prevent such
further incidents of abuse."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2131 (1999) ("It is the intent of the
legislature to provide a civil remedy for domestic violence which will afford the victim
immediate and easily accessible protection."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-101(b)(2) (West 2002)
(explaining that one of the purposes of the statute is "[t]o create a speedy remedy to discourage
violence .... ); State v. Bingaman, 991 P.2d 227, 230 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) ("The procedure is
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have been opened to actual victims of domestic violence, they also have
inadvertently been opened to persons who are not victims of domestic
violence. In fact, they have been opened to the actual abuser who seeks relief
for improper motives, such as trying to gain a tactical advantage in an
anticipated domestic violence proceeding or divorce action. 12 The ease with
which ex parte orders can be obtained creates the opportunity for this misuse,
allowing an ex parte order of protection to be granted on the basis of flimsy or
false allegations.' 3 Though a temporary restraining order in any other context
is an extraordinary remedy,' 4 ex parte orders of protection are granted
routinely at an extraordinarily high rate; in some jurisdictions, nearly one
hundred percent.1 5 The danger is presented by the ease and frequency with
designed to protect victims of domestic violence expeditiously, before there has been time to
obtain a criminal conviction."); Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So. 2d 413, 417 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
("First, we note that La. R.S. 46:2131 expressly states that one of the purposes of the domestic
abuse assistance statutes is 'to provide a civil remedy for domestic violence which will afford the
victim immediate and easily accessible protection."').
12. See, e.g., Chieco v. Chieco, 170 A.D. 2d 569, 569, 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding
that a police officer obtained a temporary ex parte order of protection against his wife not because
of "any real or perceived need for protection, but rather . . . to intimidate his wife, who had
previously commenced an action for divorce" missibly invoking the court's process as "a sword
rather than as a shield.").
13. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Los, 593 N.E.2d 126, 128, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(explaining that where a mother whose ultimate purpose was to modify a dissolution judgment
regarding child custody sought an order of protection by falsely claiming that the father
"abducted" their children when he took the children for his court-appointed summer visitation,
the court noted, "[W]e do not appreciate the way in which the judicial system was manipulated in
this situation. [The mother] should have petitioned for modification of the judgment .... Instead,
she created an inconvenient and frustrating situation for [the father] by seeking an emergency
order of protection ... "); In re Marriage of Gordon, 599 N.E.2d 1151, 1172 (111.App. Ct. 1992)
("Robert has not advanced any reason, nor can we find one, to justify his proceeding under the
Domestic Violence Act rather than the Marriage Act. Whatever the relief he sought - extended
visitation, injunction or custody - he could have received under section 610 of the Marriage Act.
To approve the procedure followed in this case would be an open invitation to parties
disappointed in a custody dispute to file a separate action under the Domestic Violence Act and
call it something other than a claim for custody . . . . In this case, however, the Domestic
Violence Act was misused and was a subterfuge to circumvent the requirements of the Marriage
Act.").
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 978, 979 (D.D.C. 1952) ("An
application for a temporary restraining order involves invocation of a drastic remedy which a
court of equity ordinarily does not grant, unless a very strong showing is made of a necessity and
desirability of such action."); see, e.g., Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836,
846 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and is not to be routinely
granted."); U.S. v. W.F. Morgan & Sons, 155 F. Supp. 40, 43 (E.D. Va. 1957) ("An injunction is
a harsh remedy ... and to be used only when fully justified."); Abdulhafedh v. Sec'y of State,
514 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("A TRO is a drastic, emergency remedy which may
issue only in exceptional circumstances and for a brief duration.").
15. See MARTHA ROSS ET AL, DEP'T OF THE ATT'Y GEN. STATE OF HAWAII, RESTRAINING
ORDERS SOUGHT tN THE CITY & COUNTY OF HONOLULU 1, 36 (1999), available at

www.cpja.ag.state.hi.us; see also Regina DuFresne & Jonathan S. Greene, Increasing Remedies
for Domestic Violence: A Study of Maryland's 1992 Domestic Violence Act in the Courtroom, 6
MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 155, 170 (1995) ("Petitioners succeeded in obtaining ex parte
orders in 85% of the cases observed (57 of 67), with no county granting ex parte orders in less
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which the ex parte orders are entered. The abuser can use an order of
protection as another means of abuse. 16 By obtaining an unwarranted ex parte
order of protection, the abuser can exclude the true victim from their shared
residence and cut her off from her children, her possessions, and, in some
situations, her means of support.17 In other words, the judicial remedy that
was intended to overcome disparity in power and income can be used as
another tool for exploiting such disparities. The courts, instead of providing a
mechanism for relief from an abusive relationship, then become yet another
tool for effectuating abuse.
We are left, therefore, with the very difficult problem of separating
justifiable grants of relief in situations where it is deserved from situations
where a party seeks ex parte relief for an improper purpose. 18
Further
exacerbating the problem is that no judge, especially one who must face
election by popular vote, wants to deny ex parte relief and have later abuse
occur. 19
The resulting consequence is that well-intentioned legislative
schemes and judicial rulings have become potential vehicles for further

abuse. 20
In this article, we will discuss how common state statutory schemes have
contributed to the abuse of orders of protection. A context for the discussion
will be established by means of two composite situations from our law school
legal clinic in which women who were the actual victims of domestic violence
had orders of protection entered against them. The article will then discuss
how various factors, such as over-worked judges and societal pressures, have
contributed to the abuse of the order of protection process. We will discuss
due process challenges to orders of protection and review the statutes of all

than 75% of the possible cases.").
16. See People v. Stiles, 779 N.E.2d 397, 402 (I11.
App. Ct. 2002) (explaining that a
defendant obtained an order of protection against his ex-girlfriend - who had already obtained
such an order against the defendant - that applied to a pub where defendant ostensibly intended
to apply for employment and later, upon entering the pub and seeing the ex-girlfriend there,
proceeded to verbally harass the woman and called the police in an attempt to have her arrested).
17. See generally Cherry Henault, The Reissuance of Domestic Violence Orders Under
Kentucky Law: A Due ProcessAnalysis, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 575, 577-78 (2001) (referencing the
author's interviews with Kentucky Circuit Court Judges John T. Daughaday and Royce W. Buck
who describe first-hand experience with the "Poor Man's Divorce," where a Domestic Violence
Order is obtained to "get a spouse out of the house to gain sole possession of any children," thus
attaining the desired objective faster than commencing divorce proceedings).
18. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 4.
19. See Henault, supra note 18 ("Even when Judge Buck is convinced that a petitioner is
abusing the system, he estimates that he grants a [Domestic Violence Order] at least 95% of the
time ....
'[fl I am going to err in my ruling, Iam going to err on the side of caution."'). But see
Woolridge v. Hickey, 700 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) ("The judge must focus on
whether serious physical harm is imminent and should not issue a [domestic violence protection]
order on the theory that it still does no harm, i.e., 'seems to be a good idea or because it will not
cause the defendant any real inconvenience"'); contra Davis v. Barbano, No. B 163121, 2004 Cal.
App. LEXIS 2033, at *13 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. March 4, 2004) (explaining how the court
"categorically reject[s] that notion as an affront to the judicial system").

88

KANSAS JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. XVIII: I

fifty states to assess what procedures may be constitutionally suspect. The
article will then take a closer look at the potential problems posed by form
pleadings designed to ease access to the courthouse. In conclusion, we will
call upon the judiciary to treat orders of protection as any other request for
emergency injunctive relief - that is, as an extraordinary remedy that should
be granted only after finding that a risk or irreparable injury is present and the
requested relief is warranted.
II. THE PROBLEM

CREATED WHEN Ex PARTE RELIEF IS OBTAINED

TOO

EASILY

Domestic violence statutes generally seek to provide a quick and simple
mechanism by which victims of domestic violence can obtain a judicial
remedy. When the petitioner seeking relief is an actual victim of domestic
violence, that goal is without reproach. Nevertheless, when the remedy
becomes too easy to obtain, a person who has not been abused can improperly
use the statutes as both a further mechanism of abuse, as well as a means to
gain strategic advantage in a related matter, such as a divorce. 21 Two
anecdotal composite situations from our law school clinic illustrate the
problem. 22
In the first, our client was a woman in her mid-thirties' who had been
married for several years and had children with her husband. She was
approximately five foot, 'two inches" and of slight build. Her husband was a
large man, over six feet tall and sturdily built. He was a jailor employed by the
Our client had been
sheriffs department of a neighboring county.
experiencing marital difficulty. She and her husband had an argument that
included talk of divorce. The next day the husband obtained an ex parte order
of protection, alleging that he was physically afraid of his diminutive wife
because of things said during the argument. The ex parte order excluded her
from the marital home and gave him custody of the children. She immediately
came to our clinic for assistance. We were able to have the ex parte order
dissolved pursuant to 750 ILCS 60/224(d)(2), which provided for a re-hearing
upon two days notice in order to establish a meritorious defense. Our client
was restored to her home and children.
In the second situation, our client was a young woman in her early
twenties. She was married to and had a child with a man considerably older
than her. He had children from a previous marriage living in the home. They
had an argument that ended in her leaving the house. He obtained an ex parte
order of protection based upon the allegation that she pushed him while he held
their child in his arms. 2 3 The emergency order excluded her from the marital
21. See infra app. A.; Stiles, 779 N.E.2d at 402.
22. Zeke Giorgi Legal Clinic, http://niu.edu/law/clinic.index.shtml (explaining that third
year law students licensed to practice pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 711 provide
representation to victims of domestic violence in the Domestic Abuse Clinic).
23. See generally Wilson v. Jackson, 728 N.E.2d 832, 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("When
petitioner did not leave, respondent 'grabbed Ansley' and 'jerked' him from petitioner's hands.
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residence and gave her husband custody of their child. She came to our clinic
several days after being served with the order. At about the same time, the
husband obtained counsel and filed for divorce. He had obtained the order of
protection pro se. Our client wanted to contest little in the divorce, and even
though she was counseled that she had defenses to the order of protection
action, she simply gave up.
The abuser successfully had exploited the
statutory scheme, using it as another form of abuse.
In each situation, a mother was excluded from her home and children
based upon a flimsy, if not non-existent, allegation of domestic abuse, and the
orders of protection should not have been granted on an emergency basis.
Neither petitioner was in fear or danger of immediate and irreparable injury.
The orders appear to have been obtained for the purpose of gaining some
strategic advantage in a contemplated divorce action.

III. FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO THE ABILITY TO MISUSE ORDERS OF
PROTECTION
Several factors contribute to the ability of orders of protections to be
misused.
To obtain relief from domestic abuse, the statutory schemes
generally require the petitioner to have been subject to "abuse," as statutorily
defined. Definitions of what constitutes abuse can be very broad, ranging from
threats or abusive language to physical violence resulting in serious bodily
harm.24 Conduct that is not harmful in actuality, or actions of the victim that

There is no indication that respondent's actions created an immediate risk of physical harm to the
child. While she may have acted abruptly, taking the child from petitioner did not constitute
physical abuse.").
24. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(b)(1) (West 2006) ("'Abuse' means any of
the following acts: (i) an act that causes serious bodily harm; (ii) an act that places a person
eligible for relief in fear of imminent serious bodily harm, (iii) assault in any degree; (iv) rape or
sexual offense under §§ 3-303 through 3-308 of the Criminal Law Article or attempted rape or
sexual offense in any degree; (v) false imprisonment; or (vi) stalking under § 3-802 of the
Criminal Law Article."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-202 (West 2002) ("'Domestic violence' or
'abuse' means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household
members, as that term is defined in section 27-204: (1) Attempting to cause or intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly causing physical harm to another with or without dangerous or deadly
weapons; (2) Placing another in reasonable apprehension of physical harm; (3) Creating fear of
physical harm by harassment, psychological abuse or threatening acts; (4) Committing either
sexual assault or sexual abuse as those terms are defined in articles eight-b and eight-d, chapter
sixty-one of this code; and (5) Holding, confining, detaining or abducting another person against
that person's will."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(C)(2) (West Supp. 2008) ("As used in the
Family Violence Protection Act . . . 'domestic abuse' . . . means any incident by a household
member against another household member . . . resulting in: (a) physical harm; (b) severe
emotional distress; (c) bodily injury or assault; (d) a threat causing imminent fear of bodily injury
by any household member; (e) criminal trespass; (f) criminal damage to property; (g) repeatedly
driving by a residence or work place; (h) telephone harassment; (i) harassment; or (j) harm or
threatened harm to children as set forth in this paragraph .... "); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
403.720(1) (West 2006) ("'Domestic violence and abuse' means physical injury, serious physical
injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical
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are justified under the circumstances, could be portrayed by the actual abuser
to fall within broad statutory definitions of abuse. 25 A person might cause
physical contact while protecting him- or herself or make statements in an
argument that could be construed as threatening. 26 Though not the type of
conduct sought to be prohibited by statutory schemes, it is conduct that meets
definitions of abuse intended to afford relief to the greatest number of
persons. 27 In the event of a race to the courthouse door in such situation, the
truly abused person could find herself the respondent in an ex parte proceeding
that excludes her from her home and takes custody of her children. 28 Thus, the
intention of the statute is turned on end, and the system intended to equalize
the power difference between the parties now becomes part of the power
differential itself.
Also contributing to the problem is the adoption by many courts of form
pleadings to aid the victim in petitioning for relief. While form pleadings
lower the barrier to the courts, especially for pro se litigants, they also can
eliminate statements of fact that could help separate fraudulent claims of abuse
from legitimate ones. For example, form pleadings approved for use in Illinois
by the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges contain the following conclusionary
statement, pleaded by the check of a box:
injury, sexual abuse, or assault between family members or members of an unmarried couple...
.").

25. See, e.g., Wilson, 728 N.E.2d at 840; State v. McMurry, 143 P.3d 400, 401-02 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2006) ("Officers ...discovered that McMurry had a black eye, lumps and bruises on her
face, red marks around her neck and a stab wound in her thigh.... Ultimately, McMurry was
charged with felony aggravated battery for stabbing Sorter. At trial, Sorter testified that he and
McMurry argued all the time and that McMurry stabbed him. Sorter testified that McMurry went
to the kitchen and picked up a knife. Sorter said he told her to put the knife down before
somebody got hurt, and then he 'got stabbed.' .. . Sorter also admitted he may have hit McMurry
on that evening. A detective testified that Sorter's knuckles were skinned and that, in his opinion,
Sorter should be charged with domestic battery."); Thompson v. Olson, 711 N.W.2d 226, 232
(N.D. 2006) ("Thompson argues the trial court erred in failing to find that Olson committed
domestic violence against him by perforating his eardrum in August 1998, in which case the
domestic violence presumption might cease to exist. However, the trial court found Olson, then
pregnant, slapped Thompson in the ear in an act of self defense to force him off of her while
Thompson sat on Olson's stomach and tried to choke her.") (citation omitted).
26. See Shana Wallace, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law and Battered
Women's Right to Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1749, 1761-62 (2004) ("If jury instructions
and statutes articulated specific factors that we actually accept in practice as defining 'necessary'
self-defense, they would allow self-defensive actions that look more anticipatory .... ");
Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionalityand the Aggressor's Culpability in
Self-Defense, 39 TULSA L. REv. 875, 886 (2004) ("Therefore, in a situation of self-defense, the
victim's course of action is not limited to means that will definitely protect [her] ...; [she] may
employ means that will provide reasonable protection, including forms of defense that may
constitute a counter-attack.").
27. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(14)(i) (West Supp. 2008) (defining abuse
as "knowing or reckless use of physical force").
28. See, e.g., Hartman v. Hartman, 621 N.E.2d 917, 918-19 (I11.
App. Ct. 1993) ("In
announcing its determination of who would be awarded custody of Lyndsey, the trial court set out
extensive findings of fact. It found that both parties had misused the Domestic Violence Act and
had raced to the courthouse to obtain exparte orders of protection against each other.").
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I did not give the Respondent notice that I am seeking
protection because I fear that giving notice would result in
further abuse or because the abuse is likely to recur before I
return to court. Good cause exists for granting the remedy of
remedies requested without prior service of process or notice. 29
Without the requirement of any supporting facts, a conclusion stated in the
alternative provides the basis for dispensing with notice, a fundamental aspect
of due process. 30 A conscientious judge not pressured by an overloaded
docket may inquire as to whether it is proper to proceed without notice, but the
opportunity exists for the over-burdened, distracted, or simply lazy judge to
accept the checked alternative conclusion that supports proceedings without
notice, one of the most fundamental elements of due process.
Of course, a petitioner seeking relief could also simply lie and make false
allegations of abuse. As a protection, all states require sworn or verified
petitions, and, in addition, most statutes contain sanctions for making
untruthful statements in the petitions. 31
Nevertheless, the proceedings
necessary to prove the untruthfulness are held days after the respondent may
have been deprived of her home or even her children. Additionally, an
unrepresented person may not be aware such a remedy exists, let alone know
how to procedurally avail him- or herself of such relief. In such case, the
actual abuser has exploited the power imbalance and gained a strategic
advantage at the same time. If a divorce action follows and the abuser has
been able to exclude the real victim from the marital home and obtain
temporary custody of the children, a court later called on to determine
permanent custody could view preservation of the status quo as a significant
factor.32 The victim turned respondent could also lose faith in the court's
ability to effectuate true justice, having had an order of protection entered
against her when such is not warranted. As a result, she gives up or accepts a
resolution that is less favorable than she could obtain from a judicial system in
which she had faith.33 This is the situation presented by the second composite

29. Circuit Court of Illinois, Verified Petition for Order of Protection, available at
www. 19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/forms/family/dv/OPPetition._Lake_051107.pdf
(emphasis
added).
30. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) ("The fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard.") (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914)); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, (1965) (explaining that a hearing must be
"granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner").
31. See infra app. A.
32. See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 608 So. 2d 755, 757 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) ("The court is
strongly impressed by the family cohesiveness of the husband's immediate family and the fact
that if the husband is the primary care taker [sic], the status quo of the family child care will be
maintained.").
33. See People v. Allen, 788 N.Y.S.2d 820, 827 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) ("If the Court were to
dismiss the defendant's criminal case it would be ignoring the interests of the complainant and
the community. Both undoubtedly would lose faith in the criminal justice system. Such a
decision also would cause the public to view the system as unconcerned about safety among
family members especially where as here, the crime underscores the issue of domestic violence,
the seriousness of which [cannot] be outweighed by the defendant's interest in avoiding
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client.
One could dismiss this concern under the belief that it is the role of judges
to weed out the real cases from the fraudulent ones, and that relief would be
entered only when truly appropriate. 34 However, the pressures on judges pull
them in several directions at the same time.
No judge wants to deny an order of protection to a person who is later
injured or killed by the person against whom they unsuccessfully sought
relief.35 Therefore, the bench may feel it is better to err in favor of the
petitioner, even though that person, by all appearances, is the person who
would be expected to hold the power in the relationship. An example from the
Tennessee Domestic Abuse Benchbook shows the pressure to grant relief to
the petitioner without giving the allegations much scrutiny:
In making the determination whether or not to issue an Ex Parte
Order, the judge or other official must liberally construe the
allegations of the Petition in favor of the petitioner, particularly
if it is filed without the assistance of an attorney. Thus if,
taking the allegations of the petition as true, it appears that the
petitioner is at risk
of continued harm, the Ex Parte Order
36
should be issued.,
At the same time, judges should also view the matter through the
additional lens of deprivation to the respondent.37 In contrast to Tennessee,
prosecution.") (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40(1)(a), (h), (g) (McKinney 2008).
34. See Creaser v. Creaser, 794 N.E. 2d 990, 991 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (describing how the
appellate court vacated an emergency order of protection because it found an abuse of discretion
when the trial court failed to hear evidence on the risk of further abuse and accepted instead the
"standard allegation" provided on the pre-printed petition); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE &
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 45 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1998) ("Even when judges are
not statutorily required to hold a hearing prior to issuing a protective order, they may find it of
value to inform themselves about the victim's circumstances .... Judges could ... assess the
petitioner's credibility and thus safeguard the rights of the defendant.").
35. See HENAULT, supra text accompanying note 20; MIKE BRIGNER, THE OHIO DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE BENCHBOOK 10-11 (Family Violence Prevention Ctr. at the Ohio Office of Criminal
Justice Servs. 2003) ("The mishandling of a single domestic violence case due to a failure to
thoroughly understand this area of the law can have disastrous results for judges as well as
victims.").
36. TENNESSEE DOMESTIC ABUSE BENCHBOOK § 3-4.01 (Kathy Skaggs ed., The
Administrative Office of the Courts and the Tennessee Coalition against Domestic and Sexual
Violence 2003), available at http://www.nowfoundation.org/issues/family/benchbooks.html
("The Court should consider the following when determining whether there is an immediate and
present danger of domestic abuse: A history of violence; Petitioner's injuries; Respondent's
access to weapons; Threats to attack petitioner; Threats to attack or abduct the children; Threats
or attacks on family or household members; Respondent's drug and alcohol abuse; Respondent's
history of a mental disorder; Respondent's threats of suicide; and Petitioner's fear of retaliation
for attempts to leave the relationship"); see also NEW MEXICO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
BENCHBOOK,
§
2.6.2
(Univ.
of
N.M.
2005),
available
at
http://jec.unm.edu/resources/benchbooks/dv/ch_2.htm (showing that New Mexico uses all but a
couple of the same factors as Tennessee to determine "immediate danger").
37. GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL PRACTICE: ABUSE PREVENTION PROCEEDINGS 1:02 B (The
Massachusetts Court System Administrative Office of the Trial Court 2004), available at
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the Massachusetts benchbook urges a process oriented on preventing wrongful
deprivation to the yet to be noticed and absent party:
Since the plaintiff is unopposed at the ex parte hearing, it is
essential that the court be satisfied that the evidence submitted
is credible, and sufficient as a matter of law, to justify the
issuance of an order. The court should question the plaintiff if
necessary, to make this determination. In certain circumstances,
inquiry beyond the face of the written affidavit or the plaintiffs
oral statement is not only appropriate, but essential to the proper
exercise of the court's authority to decide these significant
issues in the absence of an opposing party.3 8
Nevertheless, while Massachusetts gently reminds judges that "an
accusation is just that, an accusation, ' 39 its guidelines are inherently conflicted.
The benchbook cautions against "unnecessary informality" and stresses the
need for decorum where the rights of an accused are determined in his or her
absence.40 At the same time, it states that the court need not take
long nor
41
make formal findings on the record when making its determination.
Additionally, the ease of the process has made caseloads grow. For
example, in Illinois in 2006, there were 706,836 civil cases filed, 49,338 of
which were petitions for orders of protection. 42 Combining increasing case
numbers with a summary proceeding makes it less likely the individual
petitions receive the scrutiny appropriate to weed out the justified from
unjustified. It is startling that in some jurisdictions, one hundred percent of the
orders of protection sought are granted.4 3 Therefore, societal pressures might
make it an unrealistic expectation that judges are able to sort out the justified
from the unjustified, and caution can tip the balance in favor of granting the ex
parte order.
IV.

DUE PROCESS AND

Ex

PARTE ORDERS OF PROTECTION

As discussed, the common statutory scheme for orders of protection
provides for a preliminary emergency order to enter without notice or
opportunity to be heard. Due process concerns obviously are implicated.
Therefore, an examination of the propriety of the frequent use of orders of

http:www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/domestic/dvcl.html#1.02 ("When possible ... the
court should limit the duration of an ex parte order.., in order to minimize the deprivation of the
defendant's rights prior to notice and an opportunity to be heard.").
38. GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL PRACTICE: ABUSE PREVENTION PROCEEDINGS 3:06 (The

Massachusetts Court System Administrative Office of the Trial Court 2004), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/domestic/dvc3.html#3.06.
39. Id.
at
3:07,
available
at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/domestic/dvc3.html#3.07.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Illinois Circuit Court Statistics, http://www.state.il.us/court/CircuitCourt/CCStats.asp
(last visited Aug. 27, 2008).
43. See supra note 16.
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protection begins with basic due process.In addition to restraining acts of
violence, an ex parte order of protection can implicate several constitutionally
protected interests in property and liberty.44 It can operate to deprive a person
of access to his or her home and personal belongings, 45 as well as deny he or
she custody or visitation with his or her children. 46 As the typical statutory
scheme has simplified the process of obtaining an ex parte order to improve
access to judicial relief, the possibility exists for bypassing fundamental rights
of the opposing party. Though some provisions may appear facially suspect in
some regards, there has not been a successful constitutional challenge to a
statutory scheme. 47 The most thorough constitutional analysis of a domestic
violence statute is found in Blazel v. Bradley,48 a decision from the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the only federal
court that has addressed the constitutionality of a typical state statute providing
for the issuance of ex parte temporary restraining orders in domestic abuse
actions. 49 The analysis begins with the general principle that ex parte
temporary restraining orders are rarely available because they "run[] counter to
the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to
be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute."5 ° This is a strong reminder
that ex parte injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, though, as has been
discussed, ex parte emergency orders are granted in large numbers and are
regular, if not ordinary occurrences. 5'
The court determined that temporary restraining orders in domestic abuse
actions implicate due process concerns because of deprivations of interests
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 52 A
possible deprivation of property interest can occur by requiring that the alleged
44. See Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 762 (W.D. Wis. 1988) ("[T]he order can cause
two distinct deprivations. First, by requiring that the alleged abuser avoid the petitioner's
residence, in which the respondent may well have a cognizable property interest, the statute
threatens a deprivation of property which triggers due process protections. Second, the order may
implicate cognizable liberty interests if it deprives an alleged abuser of his relationship with his
children.") (citations omitted).
45. See id.; M.B. v. H.B., No. 02-34530, 2003 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 15, at *11 (Del. Fam.
Ct. May 2, 2003).
46. See Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 762.
47. See Mary M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understandingand Transcending the Criminal-CivilLaw Distinction,HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1406 (1991) ("As with other civil penalty regimes, parties have complained that CPO
practice deprives them of procedural due process. Parties have challenged ex parte relief, the
preponderance standard of proof, and the absence of appointed counsel. Courts repeatedly have
rebuffed these complaints.") (footnotes omitted). Some courts have even gone so far as to declare
a presumption of constitutionality with regard to ex parte orders of protection. See, e.g., Baker v.
Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 1992); State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 232
(Mo. 1982); H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 413-14 (N.J. 2003).
48. 698 F. Supp. at 756.
49. Id.
50. Id at 761 (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S.
423, 439 (1974)).
51. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
52. Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 762.
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abuser avoid the petitioner's residence, in which the respondent may have a
cognizable property interest, and a deprivation of a liberty interest may occur
53
by interfering with the relation between an alleged abuser and his children.
The temporary nature of the orders does not obviate basic requirements of due
process, though the nature of the process that must be provided is affected. 54
For due process purposes, the "circumstances justifying the postponing of
notice and hearing 'must be truly unusual.. . ' and must be shown to have met
three criteria: First, . . . the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an
important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a
special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control
over its monopoly of legitimate force. . . ,55 As to the latter, the majority
found that circumstances of domestic abuse restraining orders do not
completely fulfill these criteria and "are not comparable to ...cases in which
seizure or suspension without notice or hearing [has been permitted] based on
extraordinary circumstances. '56 The court reasoned that, in domestic violence
cases, "the threat of harm is less to the general public than to a private
individual," that in some instances "there is not necessarily a need for prompt
action," and that "the
deprivation is not initiated by the government but by a
57
petitioner."
private
Nevertheless, the majority proceeded to apply the factors adopted in
Mathews v. Eldridge.58 The court weighed the private interest affected, "the
risk of an erroneous deprivation under existing procedures and the probable
value of additional procedures," and "the government's interests, including the
burdens imposed by additional procedural requirements," and it reached two
conclusions. 59 First, the court found "that substantial procedural protections
are mandated by the strength of the respondent's interest in his home and
family and the evident risk of erroneous deprivation when mere allegations in a
verified petition may be the basis for an ex parte temporary restraining
order." 60 Second, the court found that "the strength of the petitioner's
countervailing interest in her home and family, the government's interest in
preventing abuse, and the possibility that prior notice may incite domestic
violence, suggest that [procedural] protections" in domestic violence cases
should not require prior notice in appropriate situations. 6 1 Faced with these
competing interests, the majority held that the Mathews factors do not "provide
substantial guidance" as to the required specific due process procedural
protections and decided to analogize instead to cases dealing with "statutes
allowing repossession of property or garnishment without prior notice and

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 763 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Id.
Id.
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hearing." 62 Following the analysis employed in this line of cases, the court
concluded that in domestic violence disputes "the due process clause requires
either a pre-deprivation hearing or at least four minimum procedural
safeguards: 1) participation by a judicial officer; 2) a prompt post-deprivation
hearing; 3) verified petitions or affidavits containing detailed allegations based
' 63
on personal knowledge; and 4) risk of immediate and irreparable harm."
The Blazel court next examined the Wisconsin statute and decided that,
while it lacked any provision for a pre-deprivation hearing, the statute satisfied
the first three of these requirements explicitly, both on its face and as applied
to the plaintiff. 64 The court noted that the statute allowed "only a judge or a
family court commissioner to issue an ex parte temporary restraining order,"
that it "provide[d] for a [mandatory] post-deprivation hearing within seven
days" after issuance of the order, and that "it require[d] a verified petition
based on personal knowledge ... containing specific allegations" made under
oath, as well as allegations of facts "sufficient to show 'that the respondent
engaged in,... [or was likely to engage in,] ... domestic abuse of the
petitioner." 65 As to the fourth criteria, the court decided that, although the
statute did not explicitly contain such requirement, the legislative history of the
statute showed that the legislature was aware of constitutional demand that ex
parte orders be issued only when there is risk of immediate and irreparable
66
harm and that the legislature intended the statute to compel such showing.
The Blazel reasoning, applying the Mathews factors, has been followed by
subsequent courts in their analysis of constitutionality of protective orders. For
example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts specifically
adopted the reasoning in Blazel with regard to procedural safeguards necessary
for an ex parte order of protection, also finding that the Massachusetts statute
met due process requirements. 67 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas applied the relevant portions of the Blazel analysis
when determining whether due process notice requirements were satisfied by a
pre-deprivation hearing. 68 In Willmon v. Daniel, the plaintiff Willmon was a
law enforcement officer who was arrested after a domestic disturbance, and he
challenged his arrest and the terms of the protective order on several
grounds. 69 The Willmon court granted summary judgment to the defendant
city and police officers on most claims, while finding triable issues of fact in
Willmon's claims of unconstitutional deprivation of employment and eviction

62. Id. at 763-64.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 764.
65. Id. (quoting Wisc. STAT. § 813.12(3)(b) (1988)).
66. Id. at 765-66.
67. Nollet v. Justices of the Trial Court of Massachusetts, 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 212-13 (D.
Mass. 2000).
68. Willmon v. Daniel, No. 3:05-CV-1391-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40658, at *21-23
(N.D. Tex. June 19, 2006).
69. See id.
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from his residence.7 °
At trial, the court found no property interest in
Willmon's at-will employment as a police officer, but it did recognize
Willmon's liberty interest in access to his residence and in his relationship with
his wife. 71 The court, applying Mathews and citing Blazel, found that his pre72
deprivation hearing while in custody satisfied due process.
State courts also have rejected due process challenges to ex parte relief
granted in protection orders. 73
"This reflects the overriding judicial
acceptance" that the "need for immediate protection of abuse victims and their
74
families" outweighs the respondent's interest in "prior notice and hearing."
Courts have routinely decided that, as balanced against the risk of further
abuse, ex parte temporary protection orders will survive procedural due
process challenges when the respondent's deprivations of property or visitation
are temporary and subject to prompt hearing. 75 Likewise, many courts have

70. Id. at *27-29.
71. Id. at *3-6.
72. Id. at *10.
73. State courts that have considered and upheld the constitutionality of ex parte orders of
protection or temporary restraining orders are MA, CT, MO, WA, IL, NJ, MI, PA, OK, TN, OH,
NY (and the Virgin Islands). See also Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1209
(Mass. 1981) (explaining that the legislative purpose in Massachusetts' Domestic Violence Act
- which defines abuse to include involuntary sexual relations engaged in by spouses constitutes a clear statement of public policy that can be used as basis for upholding a rape statute
in the case of a husband who raped and assaulted his wife who had separated from him pending
divorce proceedings); State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 236 (Mo. 1982) (holding
that Missouri's Adult Abuse Act is constitutional); People v. Revell, 402 N.Y.S.2d 522, 524
(N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1978) (explaining "strong presumption of constitutionality" of statute that
criminalizes offenses against minors, between spouses, between parent and child, or between
family or household members); People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 764-66 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1989) (holding that temporary protection order may be issued without evidentiary hearing so long
as one is held promptly after issuing the order); Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 995-96
(Okla. Civ. App. 1984) (holding that Oklahoma's Protection from Domestic Abuse Act does not
violate due process); Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767, 779 (Pa. Comm. Pl. 1979) (holding
that Pennsylvania's Protection From Abuse Act does not violate due process).
74. Klein & Orloff, supra note 4, at 1039.
75. See MacDonald v. State, 997 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); Pendleton v.
Minichino, No. 506673, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 915, at *38 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 2,
1992) (holding ex parte order that suspended visitation for fourteen days until hearing did not
violate due process); Fuller v. Fuller, 621 S.E.2d 419, 421 (Ga. 2005) ("Orders prepared ex parte
do not violate due process and should not be vacated unless 'a party can demonstrate that the
process by which the judge arrived at them was fundamentally unfair."') (quoting In re Colony
Square Co., 819 F.2d 272, 276 (11 th Cir. 1987); Sanders v. Shephard, 541 N.E.2d 1150, 1155 (111.
App. Ct. 1989) ("There is no procedural due process defect [when an ex parte order] is supported
by affidavits that demonstrate exigent circumstances ....");Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841,
844 (Iowa 1994); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 747 N.E.2d 659, 664-66 (Mass. 2001); State ex
rel. Williams, 626 S.W.2d at 232 (holding ex parte order excluding respondent from home and
prohibiting contact with children for fifteen days prior to hearing did not violate due process);
Marquette, 686 P.2d at 995-96 (holding that ex parte order that restrained respondent from
communicating with his wife and effectively denied visitation with his children for ten days prior
to the hearing did not violate procedural due process); State v. Karas, 32 P.3d 1016, 1020-21
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Schramek v. Bohren, 429 N.W.2d 501, 507 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding of reasonable basis for the legislature's creation of special procedures in situations of
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also concluded that the procedural safeguards provided by the statutes,
including sworn affidavits and mandatory judicial involvement, are protection
against erroneous deprivation of property or rights sufficient to insulate ex
parte temporary protection orders from due process attacks. 76
For example, after considering due process objections to Oklahoma's
Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, the court in Marquette v. Marquette
noted that the order was in effect for only a brief period and found that the
state's interest in providing protection to victims of domestic violence was
apparent from the considerable magnitude of the problem. 77 In ruling that the
procedures provided by the statute were adequate to satisfy due process, the
court also discussed the statute's additional safeguards and the court's ability
to judge the credibility of the petitioner and to observe any evidence of
violence firsthand.78 In Baker v. Baker, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied
the Mathews factors and concluded that the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act
provision allowing ex parte protection orders did not violate due process clause
by virtue of the following: "the state's strong interest in preventing violence in
a domestic setting;" the "special need for prompt action;" the "very narrowly
drawn" statute; and the provision in the statute that issuance of the order "must
be determined by a district court judge or other judicial officer before ex parte
79
relief is available."
In H.E.S. v. J.C.S., the court stated that "[a]t a minimum, due process
requires that a party in a judicial hearing receive 'notice defining the issues and
an adequate opportunity to prepare and respond."' 80 Further, the court
reasoned that "[t]here can be no adequate preparation where the notice does
not reasonably apprise the party of the charges, or where the issues litigated at
the hearing differ substantially from those outlined in the notice." 81' Hence, the
court concluded that to the extent that compliance with the... provision
[requiring a final hearing within ten days] precludes meaningful notice and an
82
opportunity to defend, the provision must yield to due process requirements."
In Boyle v. Boyle, a Pennsylvania common pleas court, similarly faced with a
due process challenge to the Pennsylvania's Protection from Abuse Act,
rejected the defendant's claim that he should receive notice a few days before
abuse by family or household members); Klein & Orloff, supra note 4, at 931. But cf Dittes v.
Dittes, No. CO-95-1945, 1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 238, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).

76. See Pendleton, 1992 LEXIS 915, at *34 (explaining that procedures requiring an
affidavit under oath and judicial involvement in issuing an ex parte order protected against
erroneous deprivation of rights); Sanders, 541 N.E.2d at 1155 (holding that an ex parte
emergency order supported by affidavits that demonstrate exigent circumstances - in this case,
fear of concealment of a child - does not violate procedural due process).
77. Marquette, 686 P.2d at 996.
78. Id.
79. Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 1992).
80. H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 412 (N.J. 2003) (quoting McKeown-Brand v. Trump
Castle Hotel & Casino, 626 A.2d 425 (N.J. 1993)).
81. Id. at 412 (quoting Nicoletta v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 390 A.2d 90
(N.J. 1978)).
82. Id. at 413.
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the presentation of the petition. 83 The court concluded that providing such
notice would defeat the Act's purpose of providing the plaintiff with
immediate protection. 84 Although the court noted that a notice requirement
would be more consistent with the focus of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
85
explained that such a requirement would increase the risk of violence.
Likewise, in State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh the Supreme Court of
Missouri upheld the constitutionality of the state's Adult Abuse Act, stating
that despite the significance of the defendant's interest in remaining in the
home, the statute met the standards developed by the United States Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.86 As the court explained, the requirement that
the plaintiff show "an immediate and present danger of abuse" provided
adequate procedural safeguards to meet the Supreme Court's requirements of
notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a protected
interest. 87
The court in Kampf v. Kampf, decided that obtaining, without notice, an
emergency protective order under the Michigan statute did not violate a
husband's procedural due process rights.88 The court concluded that there was
''no procedural due process defect ... when the petition for the emergency
protection order [was] supported by affidavits [demonstrating] exigent
circumstances ... and where there are appropriate provisions for notice and an
opportunity to be heard after the order is issued. ' 89 In order to issue an ex
parte order of protection, the Michigan law required a "verified complaint,
written motion, or affidavit" clearly setting forth a showing of "immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result from the delay required to
effectuate notice .... 90 Under the Michigan law the respondent had the
"right to bring a motion to rescind the protection order within fourteen days of
being served," while the court was required to "schedule a hearing on the
motion within five to fourteen days.''91 Further, the respondent could avoid
83. Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767 (C.P. Alleg. 1979).
84. Id. at 773-774.
85. Id. The court noted the imminent danger of recurrent abuse to the plaintiff if it failed to
issue the order. Furthermore, the court recognized that almost one-half of the petitioners seeking a
protection order voluntarily remove themselves from the residence and that many defendants also
voluntarily remove themselves from the residence. Thus, the court concluded, a defendant should
not be excluded from the residence unless no viable alternative exists. Id. at 774-75.
86. State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 230, 231, 232 (Mo. 1982).
87. Id. at 231; see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes, the Court held
that in a replevin suit between private individuals, the initial determination of who should retain
control of the goods require something more than an exparte proceeding before a court clerk. Id.
at 96-97. But Fuentes involved only the loss of property and the risk of physical danger was not a
factor. Id. at 92-93. Therefore, unlike the countervailing interest posed by the threat of violence
in actions involving ex parte protection orders, Fuentes involved no compelling competing
interest. See id. at 91-92 (replevin statutes serve no important governmental or compelling public
interest).
88. Kampfv. Kampf, 603 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
89. Id. at 299.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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arrest for a first violation of the order if he lacked notice. 92 For the foregoing
reasons, the procedural safeguards employed under the statute were sufficient
93
to defeat respondent's due process challenge.
Similarly, the court in Sanders v. Shephard held that no procedural due
process defect arises by virtue of the issuance of an emergency order of
protection without notice to respondent when the petition for the emergency
protection order is supported by affidavits that demonstrate exigent
94
circumstances justifying entry of an emergency order without prior notice.
The court concluded that the harm the statute intended to prevent would be
likely to occur if the respondent were given any prior notice. 95 The court
found the Illinois Domestic Violence Act, which provided the trial court "shall
issue an emergency order of protection 'regardless of prior service of process
96
or of notice upon the respondent,"' was constitutional.
In State v. Karas, the court applying the Mathews factors decided that
the ex parte protection order issued under the Washington domestic abuse
statute was proper because it ..... does not protect merely the "private right" of
the person named as petitioner in the order,"' but the public interest in
preventing domestic violence; because the "curtailment of [defendant's] liberty
imposed by the protection order" was minor; and because of the "significant
public and governmental interest in reducing the potential for irreparable
injury, the Act's provision of notice and a hearing before a neutral magistrate
97
satisfies the inherently flexible demands of procedural due process."
Finally, in the case of Pendleton v. Minichino the court considered
"challenges to the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute, C.G.S. § 46b-15,
which permits an ex parte restraining order for relief from physical abuse by a
family member to issue without prior notice or hearing." 98 The court found
that the statute was "directly necessary to effect the valid government interest
in protecting the victims of physical abuse and preventing family violence in
general." 99 "Given the compelling interest of the applicant in being free from
physical abuse[,] the important interest of the government in preventing such
abuse and the limited degree of risk of erroneous deprivation in this particular
case," the statute did not violate due process. 1oo
Despite this widespread acceptance of statutory order of protection
schemes, two aspects remain suspect on a case by case basis. First, when is a
risk of immediate and irreparable harm present so as to justify proceeding
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Sanders v. Shephard, 541 N.E.2d 1150 (l1. App. Ct. 1989).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1155.
97. State v. Karas, 32 P.3d 1016, 1020-21 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting State v. Dejarlais
969 P.2d 90 (Wash. 1998)).
98. Pendleton v. Minichino, No. 506673, 1992 WL 75920, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3,
1992).
99. Id. at *11.
100. Id.
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without notice to the opposing party? Does any action meeting the low
threshold of abuse, as defined in some statutes constitute irreparable harm?
For example, does an isolated threat or shove during an argument warrant
proceeding without notice or must there be some showing of a likelihood of
repetition? Second, if notice may be dispensed with in order to grant an
emergency, ex parte order to prevent future further abuse, may all other
remedies be similarly granted, such as possession of a shared residence,
custody of children, or deprivation of visitation? Instead, should the abuse
preventative order be granted, and further relief await notice and opportunity to
be heard?
It is interesting to compare the Blazel v. Bradley analysis and its progeny
to the requirements for granting temporary restraining orders without notice
contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b). 10 1 The Blazel court
rejected plaintiffs argument that Rule 65(b) codified constitutional
requirements for ex parte temporary restraining orders.10 2 Nevertheless,
safeguards reflected in Rule 65(b) reflect how to protect the interests of the
absent party and ensure justice is done. In most respects, the Blazel reasoning
is in accord with Rule 65(b). The participation of a sworn judicial officer is
obviously required. The rule also requires an affidavit or verified complaint
for a temporary restraining order to issue without notice. 10 3 Likewise, Rule
65(b) restricts ex parte temporary restraining orders to those instances in which
immediate and irreparable harm would occur. 104 Finally, the rule requires that
the hearing on a preliminary injunction be held at the earliest possible time and
take precedence over all other matters. 105
Rule 65(b) goes further and requires additional protections. The moving
party's attorney must certify any efforts to give notice and reasons in favor of
dispensing therewith, and requires specific sworn facts supporting a finding of
immediate and irreparable injury. 10 6 It is in this regard that orders of
protection can fall short, especially when form pleadings are used with
conclusionary statements that notice must be dispensed with because of the
risk of injury. 107 If notice would place the petitioner at peril, it obviously
should not be given. But, if affording a respondent notice can be accomplished
without risk of harm, notice should be given in order to safeguard against the
types of abuse of the protective order mechanism experienced by the

101. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (Temporary Restraining Order. (1) Issuing Without Notice.
The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse
party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse
party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts
made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.).
102. Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F.Supp. 756, 761 (D. Wis. 1988).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
104. Id.
105. FED. R. Cv. P. 65(b)(3).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
107. See infra Part VI.
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composite clients.
States may be well-served to incorporate the two preceding requirements.
Specifically, a requirement that the court define the injury and state why it is
irreparable so that notice may be dispensed with would go far in reducing the
number of improperly granted ex parte protective orders. Such a statutory
scheme would place the burden upon the court to state its findings and
elucidate its reasoning, while preserving the simplicity and expedience that
form pleadings afford the victims of domestic abuse. Indeed, the unintended
consequences of "checking boxes" seem more acceptable when weighed
against the need to provide simple, easy-to-understand form pleadings to the
victims of domestic abuse. Where the court is concerned, pre-printed forms
are a matter of convenience, and it is fair to ask judges to pick up the pen and
record their reasoning.
Similarly, affording the adverse party an opportunity to contest the ex
parte order prior to the plenary hearing further reduces the adverse
consequences of the nationwide effort to make domestic violence protective
orders more accessible. As noted, the Illinois' domestic violence statute
contains just such a provision, and our law school clinic experiences
demonstrate that it can be used to quickly correct the most egregious and
flagrant abuses.
V. SURVEYING THE STATUTORY SCHEMES

Blazel and its progeny established criteria by which the constitutionality
of state statute schemes may be measured. Rule 65(b), as noted, contains
somewhat greater procedural protections, which, though more desirable, are
not mandated by due process concerns. A survey of the statutes reveals
varying degrees of compliance with these principles.
A. Participationby judicial officer
The majority of state statutes complies with the first of the Blazel
requirements and provides for some form of judicial participation in the
process of entering ex parte orders of protection. Forty-six jurisdictions
demand that ex parte orders of protection are issued by the court, including
district, circuit or superior court. 108
Nevertheless, the laws of three jurisdictions specifically authorize persons
other than a judge to issue orders of protections. 109 Although these issuing
officers are called "specifically-authorized masters," the particular provisions
defining this term refer to nothing more than a licensed attorney appointed to
hear petitions for protection. 1 0 Hence, these schemes may be suspect.
108. See infra app. A.
109. See infra app. A.
110. For example, in Massachusetts the law provides that orders necessary to protect the
plaintiff may be issued by telephone when the court is closed or the plaintiff is unable to appear
on account of physical hardship. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West 2007). The
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B. A Prompt Post-deprivation Hearing
As recognized in Blazel and as reflected in Rule 65(b), due process
generally requires that the respondent receive notice of any action resulting in
the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest."' 1 2Accordingly, the
majority of state ex parte relief is granted for a short period.' 1
Blazel required a hearing within seven days of issuance. 113 Under Rule

65(b) if ten days elapse before the preliminary hearing injunction, the ex parte
order automatically expires.' 14 Using these benchmarks the state statutes can

be regarded as suspect

15

or non-suspect,

116

in this regard.

Notably, some

statute allows any issuing officers, in the interest of justice, to grant relief via telephone
communication to an officer or employee of an appropriate law enforcement agency. Id. The
officer records the order on a form promulgated by the chief administrative justice and a copy of
the order is delivered to the clerk-magistrate of the court having venue and jurisdiction over the
matter on the next court day. Id. Due to the preeminent role of non-judicial officers in the
issuance of these orders, the statutes described are arguably suspect under Blazel v. Bradley. 698
F.Supp. 756, 761 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
111. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1); Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 762.
112. See infra app. A. However, not every state provides for a full mandatory hearing after
issuance of an exparte protective order and the time period between entering of the exparte order
and conducting the hearing varies greatly.
113. Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 764.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).
115. See infra app. A. These laws allow mandatory post-deprivation within ten days or
only upon request of the respondent. Twenty-one states and the Lerman Model Code provide for
a mandatory post-deprivation hearing within eight to fourteen days from filing a petition or from
issuance of ex parte order of protection. See ALA. CODE § 30-5-6 (1998); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14-102 (West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West 2004); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1043(d) (2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1004(d) (Supp. 2008); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-13-3(c) (West 2003.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6308(5) (2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 60/220(a)(1) West 1999); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(4) (West 2006); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 4 (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-1 1(1) (West 2007); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-4(D) (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-2(c) (West Supp. 2007);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-03(4) (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(D)(2)(a) (West
Supp. 2008); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(a), (b) (West Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1104(b) (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.070(4) (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4827-403(d) (West Supp. 2008); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(3)(c) (West Supp. 2008). Notably,
Idaho is the only state that allows respondent to an ex parte order the opportunity to petition the
court for an earlier hearing. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6308(5) (2006).
Eleven jurisdictions provide for a mandatory hearing on ex parte orders of protection within
fifteen to twenty-nine days. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(5)(c) (West Supp. 2008); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 586-5(b) (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.4(1) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603106(a) (2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(B) (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, § 4006(1) (Supp,. 2007-08); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.040(1) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-15-202(l) (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(B)(1) (West Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (West Supp. 2008); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4.3(l)(a) (West 2004). In
order to determine whether the period of deprivation runs afoul of due process, it is necessary to
consider the date such deprivation begins. States differ in this regard, with the period in Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Missouri, and Oklahoma running from the date of the petition for protection as
opposed to the date of issuance of the ex parte order. IOWA CODE § 236.4(1) (2008); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3106(a) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4006(1) (Supp. 2007-08); and MO.
ANN. STAT. § 455.040(l) (West 2005). Since the date of application for protection may be eight
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states do not require an automatic post-deprivation hearing.1

7

Others tie the

to twenty-two days earlier than the date of entering of the ex parte order, in certain circumstances
the statutes will fulfill the due process norm of a seven day time limit for post-deprivation hearing
accepted in Blazel. See supra note 102. Likewise, in Iowa there is a requirement for a minimum
period of five days before a hearing on the ex parte order is held by the court. IOWA CODE §
236.4(1) (2008). This duration requirement seems to be unique and there is no provision for
hearings prior to five days post-issuance. Presumably, if a hearing is held between days five and
seven, the statute will not violate the due process requirements of Blazel. See supra note 102.
The statutes of three jurisdictions permit courts to grant ex parte protection orders and provide for
mandatory post-deprivation hearings after twenty-nine days, either from the filing of the petitions
for or from the issuance of such orders. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-206(d) (West 2004); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-10(b) (West Supp. 2008); and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-4 (2004). It
may be that these laws are constitutionally suspect with regard to the due process rights of the
respondents. Like the Ohio statute, in Indiana, the right to a hearing is conditioned upon the type
of relief granted by the ex parte protection order. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-10(a),(b) (West
Supp. 2008). Where relief does not trigger a mandatory hearing, the court schedules one only
upon a request by either party. Id.
Only one jurisdiction, Rhode Island, does not set a specific time for the mandatory postdeprivation hearing. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4(a)(2) (2006). Instead, like Rule 65(b), the statute
calls for a mandatory hearing on the ex parte order within a reasonable time, taking precedence
over all other matters. Id.
116. Only three states provide for post-deprivation hearings within seventy-two hours after
the issuance of the ex parte order of protection. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3.2(E) (West
Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(B)(1), (2) (West Supp. 2009); and WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 35-21-104(a)(iii) (2007). Two states' statutes provide for ex parte orders of protection
lasting seven days before a mandatory hearing is required. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518B.01(5)(c) (West Supp. 2008); and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(D)(2) (West Supp.
2008). Interestingly, the nature of the relief granted determines the time period within which a
full hearing must be held. In Minnesota, a mandatory hearing must be held within seven days
only if the petitioner is seeking relief beyond restraining the abusing party from committing acts
of domestic abuse; excluding such party from the shared dwelling; excluding from or limiting
access of the abusing party to the place of employment of the petitioner; or continuing all
insurance coverage without change in coverage or beneficiary designation. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518B.01(5)(b)-(d) (West Supp. 2008). In Ohio, if the court, after an ex parte heaing, enters an
order which grants possession of the residence or household to the petitioner to the exclusion of
the respondent, a full hearing on the ex parte order must be held within seven court days. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.3 1(D)(2)(a), (E)(1) (West Supp. 2008). If any other type of ex parte
protection order is issued, the hearing is to be held within ten court days after the issuance of the
order. Id. The laws described above provide for a mandatory hearing only in cases where the
relief granted falls within certain categories defined by the statutes. Because these categories are
not necessarily based upon due the process considerations and due to their limitations on hearing
within 7 days, these statutes are ostensibly suspect,
117. See infra app. A. Fifteen states do not provide for a post-deprivation hearing, but
allow the court to grant an ex parte order of protection that expires after a statutorily prescribed
time period. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.110(b) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6256(a), (b) (West 2004);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-103(0 (West 2005); IOWA CODE § 236.6(2) (2008); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3105(b) (2005); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-505(c) (West 2006); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4 (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3.2(E) (West Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50B-2(c) (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-08 (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §
60.4(B)(1) (West Supp. 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6110(a), (b) (West Supp. 2008); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4(b)(1), (4) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.4(C) (2007); and Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 35-21-104(a)(iii) (2007). In almost all of these states such ex parte orders are
issued only in exigent circumstances, such as imminent danger to the victim or the unavailability
of a court or judge. Id. The absence of a hearing is offset by the fact that the orders expire
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requirement of a post-deprivation hearing to the relief granted, where that
relief implicates the constitutionally recognized liberty interests in home or
family. For instance, in Indiana no post-deprivation hearing is required unless
the relief granted excludes respondent from use of the home or automobile, or
118
where visitation rights have been determined in an ex parte proceeding.
Similarly, both Arizona and Ohio require that the mandatory plenary
hearing be expedited where the relief granted excludes respondent from the
residence. 119
C. Verified petitions or affidavits
Rule 65(b) requires the filing of an affidavit or verified complaint setting
forth specific facts, but does not explicitly mandate personal knowledge on the
part of the petitioner (although this deficiency may be off-set, somewhat, by
the bond requirement). 120
Likewise, the Blazel court required verified
petitions in order to comport with due process. Blazel's test contains three sub
requirements: verified petitions by the persons seeking protection, detailed
21
allegations of abuse, and allegations based on personal knowledge. 1
The laws of eighteen jurisdictions require specific allegations of instances
of domestic abuse or violence and do not violate respondent's due process
rights. 122 The rest of the statutes do not contain any provisions regarding the

automatically within twenty-four to seventy-two hours. Id.
In eleven states, the statutes do not provide for mandatory post-deprivation hearing dates, but
allow a court to hold hearings upon request by the respondent, petitioner or any party affected by
the exparte protection order. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.110 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133602(1) (Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-10(a) (West Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2950(13) (West Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(5)(d) (West Supp. 2008);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-925 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.080(5) (West 2000); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(i) (West 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(l) (2002); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 107.718(8)(a) (West Supp. 2008); and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 83.002(a) (Vernon
2002). Notably, in three of the jurisdictions, Minnesota, Michigan, and Oregon, hearings must be
demanded within a statutorily established period after the alleged abuser has received notice.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(5) (West Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(13)
(West Supp. 2008); and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.718(8)(a) (West Supp. 2008). This
requirement seems to be unique, but can probably be explained by the need to protect the rights of
respondents by expediting hearings on ex parte orders of protection. Once a party requests a
hearing, most statutes generally define a time within which the hearing must be held. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 13-3602(I) (Supp. 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-10(a) (West Supp. 2008);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (West Supp. 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §42-925 (2004);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.080(5) (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(I) (2002); and
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 83.002(a) (Vernon 2002). In Arizona, however, the time period for the
hearing again depends on the relief granted by the ex parte order of protection - five days if the
order awards exclusive use of the home and ten days in all other cases. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 133602(I) (Supp. 2008).
118. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-26-5-9(b)-(c), -10(b) (West Supp. 2008).
119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602(I) (Supp. 2008) (requires a hearing within five days if the
respondent is excluded from the residence but within ten days for all cases).
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
121. Blazel, 698 F. Supp. 756, 764 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
122. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(C)(3) (Supp. 2008) ("The petition shall... [offer a]
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[s]pecific statement, including dates, of the domestic violence alleged."); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
741.30(3)(b)(h) (West Supp. 2008) ("Petitioner is either a victim of domestic violence or has
reasonable cause to believe he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic
violence because respondent has (mark all sections that apply and describe in the spaces below
the incidents of violence or threats of violence, specifying when and where they occurred,
including, but not limited to, locations such as a home, school, place of employment, or visitation
exchange) .... "); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(b) (West 2003) ("Upon the filing of a verified
petition in which the petitioner alleges with specific facts that probable cause exists to establish
that family violence has occurred in the past and may occur in the future, the court may order
such temporary relief ex parte as it deems necessary to protect the petitioner or a minor of the
household from violence."); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-3(c) (West 2008) ("A petition for
relief shall be in writing upon forms provided by the court and shall allege, under penalty of
perjury, that: a past act or acts of abuse may have occurred; threats of abuse make it probable that
acts of abuse may be imminent; or extreme psychological abuse or malicious property damage is
imminent; and be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath or a statement made under
penalty of perjury stating the specific facts and circumstances from which relief is sought.");
IOWA CODE § 236.3(5) (2008) ("The petition shall state the ... (n)ature of the alleged domestic
abuse."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.730(1)(c) (West 2006) ("A petition filed pursuant to KRS
403.725 shall be verified and shall contain... (t)he facts and circumstances which constituted the
alleged domestic violence and abuse ..
"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2134(A)(2) (Supp. 2008)
("A petition filed under the provisions of this Part shall contain the ... facts and circumstances
concerning the alleged abuse."); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-504(b)(1)(ii) (West 2006) ("The
petition shall ... include any information known to the petitioner of. . . (1) the nature and extent
of the abuse for which the relief is being sought, including information known to the petitioner
concerning previous injury resulting from abuse by the respondent ....
); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
518B.01(4)(b) (West Supp. 2008) ("A petition for relief shall allege the existence of domestic
abuse, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath stating the specific facts and
circumstances from which relief is sought."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-3(B) (West Supp. 2008)
("The petition shall be made under oath or shall be accompanied by a sworn affidavit setting out
specific facts showing the alleged domestic abuse."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.3 I(C) (West
Supp. 2008) ("A person may seek relief under this section on the person's own behalf, or any
parent or adult household member may seek relief under this section on behalf of any other
family or household member, by filing a petition with the court. The petition shall contain or
state: (1) An allegation that the respondent engaged in domestic violence against a family or
household member of the respondent, including a description of the nature and extent of the
domestic violence .... "); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.710(1) (West Supp. 2008) ("The person
may seek relief by filing a petition with the circuit court alleging that the person is in imminent
danger of abuse from the respondent, that the person has been the victim of abuse committed by
the respondent within the 180 days preceding the filing of the petition and particularly describing
the nature of the abuse and the dates thereof."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4 (a)(2) (2006) ("If it
clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff before notice can be served and a
hearing held on the matter, the court may enter any temporary order without notice that it deems
necessary to protect the plaintiff."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-6(a)(5) (2006) ("A form in
substantially the following language shall suffice for the purpose of filing a complaint[:] ... On
or about _
I suffered abuse when the defendant:
_____
Threatened or harmed me with a weapon; (type of weapon used: __
.)
Attempted to cause me physical harm
__
Caused me physical harm
__
Placed me in fear of imminent physical harm
___
Caused me to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat of force, or duress.
Specifically, the defendant[.]"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40(b) (Supp. 2007) ("A petition
for relief must allege the existence of abuse to a household member. It must state the specific
time, place, details of the abuse, and other facts and circumstances upon which relief is sought
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allegations contained in the petitions or it simply states that a person seeking
protection allege abuse or an immediate and present danger of such abuse by
Since these laws lack a specificity requirement, they
the defendant. 123
arguably violate due process.
D. Showing Irreparable Harm
As suggested above, it is in the arena of irreparable harm that Rule 65(b)
is superior to minimum due process protection. 124 Rule 65(b) not only
requires the temporary restraining order to define the injury and state why it is
irreparable, it issues only if it clearly appears from the specific facts shown
"that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the

and must be verified."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-3(2) (2004) ("A petition shall allege the
existence of domestic abuse and shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath stating the
specific facts and circumstances of the domestic abuse."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.50.030(1) (West Supp. 2008) ("A petition for relief shall allege the existence of domestic
violence, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath stating the specific facts and
circumstances from which relief is sought."); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-403(a) (West Supp.
2008) ("Clear and convincing evidence of immediate and present danger of abuse to the petitioner
or minor children shall constitute good cause for the issuance of an emergency protective order
pursuant to this section."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-103(b) (2007) ("The petition shall be made
under oath or be accompanied by a sworn affidavit setting out specific facts showing the alleged
domestic abuse."); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-104(a) (Westlaw through 2008 Budget Sess.)(i)
("Upon the filing of a petition for order of protection, the court shall ... (i)mmediately grant an
ex parte temporary order of protection if it appears from the specific facts shown by the affidavit
or by the petition that there exists a danger of further domestic abuse .... ").
123. ALA. CODE § 30-5-5(a) (Supp. 2008); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6300 (West 2004); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 1043(a) (2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/203(a) (West Supp. 2008);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-201(1) (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(l) (Supp. 2008);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(a) (2005); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS § 821(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2008);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-2(a) (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2(A) (West
2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 60.3(A) (West 2003); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(a)
(West Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-602(a) (West Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-3-605(a) (West Supp. 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 83.001(a) (Vernon 2002); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 82.002 (a)-(c) (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-103 (West Supp. 2008),
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-106(1) (West Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(a) (2007);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104 (a) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253(A)-(B) (2007); VA. CODE
ANN. §16.1-253.1(A) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §16.1-253.4(B) (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4827-305 (West Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-403(a) (West Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 813.12(5)(a) (West Supp. 2008).
124. Black's Dictionary defines irreparable injury as "[aln injury that cannot be adequately
measured or compensated by money and is therefore often considered remediable by injunction."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (8th ed. 2004). American Jurisprudence states, "The judicial
power to grant injunctive relief should be exercised only when intervention is essential to protect
property or other rights from irreparable injury.... Irrespective of the magnitude of the injury, it
must be sufficiently probable that the defendant's future conduct will violate and irreparably
injure a right of the plaintiff... Irreparable harm is measured in terms of the harm arising during
the interim between the request of injunction and final disposition of the case on the merits." 42
AM JUR. 2D Injunctions § 33 (2000). "Irreparable injury has been shown by: damage to human
dignity and peace of mind; frustration of a judgment[;] . . . [plossible loss or destruction of
property." 42 AM JUR. 2D Injunctions § 34 (2000).
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25
[applicant] ....
Minnesota's statute, for example, stands in stark contrast to Rule 65(b)
stating, "[a] finding by the court that there is a basis for issuing an ex parte
order for protection constitutes a finding that sufficient reasons exist not to
require notice under applicable court rules governing applications for ex parte
relief." 126 This approach begs the question and turns due process on its head.
Rather than requiring a specific finding as Rule 65(b) does, that notice is not
required as a precondition to granting ex parte relief, this statute does the
opposite: Issuance of the order, without notice, is deemed to justify dispensing
with notice. This makes the judge's job easier but burdens the respondent who
is deprived of notice in the absence of any finding specific finding of imminent
harm to petitioner.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
irreparable harm in the area of domestic violence, however, the Court's ruling
in other areas of injunctive relief are instructive. In Trainorv. Hernandez, the
majority held that irreparable injury, as a precondition for equitable relief, must
be "both great and immediate." 127 This high threshold is reflected in numerous
circuit court decisions. 128 The few state courts that have addressed the issue
of imminent irreparable injury favor an individualized objective standard.

125. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
126. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(7)(b) (West Supp. 2008).
127. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 442 (1977).
128. Generally, opinions on the subject agree. First, that a showing of irreparable injury is
necessary for issuance of injunctions. Accordingly, in Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel
Supply Co. the court held that irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting 11 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 2948 (1973)). The
majority in Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int'l, Inc. insisted that, as a general rule, "the moving
party must first demonstrate that such injury is likely before the other requirements for the
issuance of an injunction will be considered." 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir. 1990).
Second, judges agree that the irreparable harm determination is a difficult and close question.
Two appellate courts have opined that "[t]he concept of irreparable harm 'does not readily lend
itself to definition."' Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1250 (10th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Wis. Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). The very nature of the term "makes it difficult to define every situation the term
encompasses ....
Sullivan v Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 1987). In any event, it is
not an "easy burden to fulfill." Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th
Cir. 2003) (citing Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp. 204 F.3d 475, 485 (3d Cir. 2000). See also
PrairieBand of PotawatomiIndians, 253 F.3d at 1250.
Third, the courts have reached consensus on the contours of irreparable harm. Case law indicates
that the injury "'must be both certain and great,' (citation omitted) and that it must not be 'merely
serious or substantial."' Id. (quoting A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 525 (3d Cir.
1976)). Accordingly, the majority in Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc. held that, in an action for
injunction, "the movant must demonstrate 'an injury that is neither remote nor speculative ....51 F.3d 328, 332 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Tucker Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesigner, 888 F.2d
969, 975 (2d Cir. 1989)). The petitioner must show her injury to be actual, imminent and one that
cannot be remedied by a monetary award. Id.; see also Reuters Ltd., 903 F.2d at 907; Loveridge
v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 788 F.2d 914, 917-18 (2d Cir. 1986); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979).
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"One that looks at the situation in the light of the circumstances as would be
perceived by a reasonable person in the petitioner's position .... ,129
In domestic violence cases appellate courts have decided that the standard
is met where there is an immediate danger to a child's safety, for example, in
130
the case of an inebriated father who beats his children and has not fed them.
The threat to a child's safety is justification enough to take immediate action
and hold a hearing later, and, so long as such a hearing is provided, there is no
denial of due process in refusing to grant a full adversary hearing before taking
away property or liberty. 131
In Blazel v Bradley, the most thorough
constitutional analysis of a domestic violence statute to date, the court read a
statutory requirement for showing physical violence to mean a showing of
imminent danger. 132 The court concluded that any allegation of bodily harm
33
makes the showing of irreparable harm. 1
Most statutes do not define immediate and irreparable injury in the
context of domestic violence. Generally, the laws in different states seem to
equate "abuse" with "injury" and in many states, a finding of "imminent
danger of abuse" is a satisfactory basis for granting an ex parte order of
protection. The majority of statutes also contain a laundry list of acts that
constitutes abuse or domestic violence. The broader of these definitions raise
the question of whether certain types of abuse are immediate and irreparable
injuries, thereby justifying ex parte orders of protection.
The courts, however, have generally upheld these broad statutory
provisions. Because each case and its facts are unique to each complainant, it
is inevitable that different standards are applied in determining whether there
exists an immediate and present danger of abuse.' 34 As the majority in Boyle
explained, "a case by case determination of abuse petitions based upon the

129. Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 775 A.2d 1249, 1259 (Md. 2001). Generally, a
showing of actual or threatened physical violence/harm is required to meet the requirement of
irreparable harm. Sandy v. Sandy, 316 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
Following this line of reasoning the court in D.T. v. H.S., for example, held that "[i]mmediate and
irreparable harm means: (1) there is an immediate threat to the health and safety of a child, due to
the fact that serious physical abuse to the child or another member of the child's household has
previously occurred or been threatened and there is a likelihood of it occurring or reoccurring to
the child or to a member of the child's household; (2) there is a threat of immediate harm to the
health of the child, due to the present deprivation of food, shelter, or medical attention; or (3) a
child has been removed from the State of Delaware in violation of a statute or court order." No.
CK04-03972, 2004 Del. Fain Ct. LEXIS 146, at *5 n.5 (Del. Fam. Ct. Aug. 18, 2004) (quoting
DEL. FAM. CT. Civ. P. R. 65.2). Another court found that removing children from the state,
subjecting children to verbal or emotional abuse is irreparable injury. Kanth v. Kanth, No.
20010718-CA, 2002 WL 31770985, at *4 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2002). In Marquette v.
Marquette, the majority explained that a petition alleging "harassment, assault, throwing children,
verbal threats, and fear of harm" was sufficient where the statute required a showing of imminent
serious physical harm. 686 P.2d 990, 994 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984).
130. Lossman v. Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288, 289, 291 (7th Cir. 1983).
131. Id. at 291; see also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1977).
132. Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F.Supp. 756, 765-766 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
133. Id. at 768.
134. Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 767, 776 (C.P. Alleg. 1979).
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circumstances of each case
is the only practical means of implementing
35
[domestic violence acts]."1
Only a few jurisdictions define the term "irreparable injury" in their
For example, under Idaho's provisions
domestic violence statutes.' 36
irreparable injury "includes but is not limited to situations in which the
respondent has recently threatened the petitioner with bodily
injury or has
37
engaged in acts of domestic violence against the petitioner."
Twenty-two jurisdictions allow issuance of ex parte orders of protection
on finding of immediate and present danger of abuse. 38 Eight states permit
relief if there is allegation of incidents of past abuse.' 39 Notably, some statutes

135. Id. at 776-77. Following this line of reasoning and after the California legislature
expanded the definition of domestic violence and abuse to "embrace nonviolent but harassing
conduct," the court in Ritchie v. Konrad, decided that it could "impose a protective order not only
because of prior or threatened bodily injury, but also where the restrained party has only been
'stalking, . . . harassing, telephoning, including, but not limited to, annoying telephone calls[,]...
destroying personal property, contacting, either directly or indirectly by mail or otherwise,
coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of the other party...... 10 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 387, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). The court stated that although this sort of nonviolent
behavior in some circumstances is not enough to place the other person in "reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury," such a finding in order to issue a protective
order is no longer necessary in light of the statutorily provided nonviolent acts." Id. at 404.
136. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6308(3) (West 2006) ("Irreparable injury under this section
includes but is not limited to situations in which the respondent has recently threatened the
petitioner with bodily injury or has engaged in acts of domestic violence against the petitioner.");
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-4(a)(2) (2006) ("If it clearly appears from specific facts shown by
affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the plaintiff before notice can be served and a hearing held on the matter, the court may
enter any temporary order without notice that it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff");
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.070(1) (West 2005) ("[l]rreparable injury could result from
domestic violence if an order is not issued immediately.
...); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
26.50.070(2) (West 2005) ("Irreparable injury under this section includes but is not limited to
situations in which the respondent has recently threatened petitioner with bodily injury or has
engaged in acts of domestic violence against the petitioner.").
137. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6308(3) (West 2006).
138. See infra app. A.

139. When statutes define abuse, it usually includes violent acts or crimes against the
person of family members or children, such as: assault or attempted assault; child abuse; criminal
coercion; harassment; kidnapping; sexual abuse or assault; rape or sexual offense; engaging in
sexual acts with minor; unlawful/false imprisonment; physical harm; bodily injury; the infliction
of fear of imminent physical harm; intentionally placing, by physical threat, another in fear of
imminent bodily injury; communicating to a person a threat to commit, or to cause to be
committed, a crime of violence dangerous to human life; terroristic threats; extreme psychological
abuse; harassment; severe emotional distress and harm or threatened harm to children. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(a)(1) (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103(3) (West Supp. 2008); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 6203 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 10, §1041(1) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 586-1 (2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(1) (West Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE §
236.2(2) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102(a) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West
2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(3) (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, §
4002(1) (Supp. 2007-08); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501(b)(1) (West 2006); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-21-3(a) (West Supp. 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1(I) (2002); N.M. STAT.
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include, in the definition of abuse,
acts or crimes against property or other acts
40
not directed against the person.1
In contrast to the term abuse, the phrase "domestic violence" is rarely
defined by the statutes. When it is, its definition is not very different than the
one used for abuse,1 41 and generally includes violent acts such as: homicide;
assault; aggravated assault; battery; aggravated battery; sexual assault or abuse;

sexual battery; stalking; aggravated stalking; kidnapping; false imprisonment;

ANN. § 40-13-2(C) (West Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1(1) (West Supp. 2009); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102 (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1(2) (2006); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-4-20(a) (Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §25-10-1(1) (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-7-102(l) (West Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101(1) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §
16.1-228 (2007). See also infra app. A.
140. For example, in four jurisdictions family abuse includes trespass to property. E.g.,
ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(a)(1)(m) (1998) (Trespass is defined as "[e]ntering or remaining in the
dwelling or on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so either orally or in
writing by the owner of the premises or other authorized persons."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
1041(1)(e) (Supp. 2008) (Abuse includes "[tirespassing on or in property of another person, or on
or in property from which the trespasser has been excluded by court order .... ); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25-19(a)(12) (West 2005) (including criminal trespass as a type of domestic violence);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(C)(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008) (including criminal trespass as a type of
domestic abuse). Six states include acts resulting in destruction of property, or simple theft and
burglary. E.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(a)(1)(1) (1998) (Theft is defined as "[kinowingly obtaining
or exerting unauthorized control or obtaining control by deception over property owned by or
jointly owned by the plaintiff and another."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(1)(c) (Supp. 2008)
("Intentionally or recklessly damaging, destroying or taking the tangible property of another
person.. ." is a type of abuse.); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-1 (West 2008) ("Domestic abuse"
includes "[mialicious property damage ....");N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:l(1)(e) (2002)
("Abuse" includes "[d]estruction of property ....");N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a)(1 1) (West
2005) ("Domestic violence means the occurrence of... [b]urglary"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-132(C)(2)() (West Supp. 2008) ("[D]omestic abuse" includes "criminal damage to property ....
").
Five statutes are so broad that they include acts, repeated and without cause, such as: following
the plaintiff, being at or in the vicinity of the plaintiffs home, school, business or place of
employment; interference with an emergency call; unauthorized entry; lewdness; criminal
mischief, acts resulting in severe emotional distress; repeatedly driving by a residence or work
place; and telephone harassment. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002(l)(F) (Supp.
2007-08) ("Following the plaintiff; or [b]eing at or in the vicinity of the plaintiffs home, school,
business or place of employment" is abuse.); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(2)(a)(3) (West Supp. 2008)
(Domestic abuse includes "interference with an emergency call."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:l(I)(f) (2002) (Abuse includes "[u]nauthorized entry."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a)(9),
(10) (West 2005) (Domestic violence includes "[l]ewdness" and "[c]riminal mischief."); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(C)(2)(b), (g), (f) (West Supp. 2008) (Domestic abuse includes "severe
emotional distress; .. .repeatedly driving by a workplace; [and] telephone harassment ....").
Finally, in two jurisdictions legislative provisions define domestic abuse as any other conduct
directed toward a member of the protected class that could be punished as a criminal act under the
laws of the state or any other conduct which a reasonable person under the circumstances would
find threatening or harmful. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(a)(1)(h) (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
1041(1)(h) (Supp. 2008).
141. Though, again, in four states the statutes are so broad that they include in the definition
such conduct as trespass, arson, larceny, burglary or destruction of property. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-13-1(2) (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a)(11), (12) (West 2005); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33.018(l)(e) (West Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1(4), (4)(1) (West
Supp.2008).
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or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death; any felony;
physical injury; terroristic threats; physical harm; bodily injury; the infliction
of fear of imminent physical harm; bodily injury; and possession of a deadly
weapon with intent to assault. 142
VI. FORM PLEADINGS AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR
While the issuance of emergency, ex parte orders of protection
unfortunately is not an unusual event in present society, 43 they are
extraordinary events in terms of civil litigation. 144 The party against whom
they are entered may be deprived of property or liberty without notice and/or
opportunity to be heard. It is only to protect against an irreparable injury that
the fundamental dictates of due process, notice and opportunity to be heard, are
deferred until a later hearing. 145
It is doubtful that anyone would argue that an abused person should be
entitled to immediate relief without unnecessary procedural obstacles.
Legislatures have appropriately determined that protection from domestic
142. See, e.g., FLA. STAT, ANN. § 741-28(2) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (West
2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(1) (2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/103(1), (3) (West
Supp. 2008); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.720(1) (West 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173B:I(I), (IX) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a) (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
33.018(1) (West Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(2) (2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.004 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1(4) (West Supp. 2008).
143. For example, a survey published in 2005 sampled twenty-five (25) North Carolina
counties during a specified two-week period. Douglas L. Yearwood, JudicialDispositionsof ExParte and Domestic Violence Protection Order Hearings: A Comparative Analysis of Victim
Requests and Court Authorized Relief 20 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 160 (June 2005). In the twentytwo (22) counties where the courts completed the survey the follow ex parte relief was granted:
(1) Possession of the Residence - 90% (85 of 95 requests); (2) No Contact with Plaintiff - 89%
(186 or 209 requests); (3) Possession and Use of the Vehicle - 86% (57 of 66 requests); and (4)
Eviction of Defendant - 86% (68 or 73 requests). Id. at 165.
144. State v. Beeler, 530 So.2d 932, 933 (Fla. 1988) ("A temporary injunction without
notice is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted sparingly."). But see MacDonald v.
State, 997 P.2d, 1187, 1189-90 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) ("The issuance of exparte orders is not an
unusual procedure. Courts issue exparte orders in a variety of situations .... ).
145. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972) ("Before a person is
deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded opportunity for some kind of a hearing,
'except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that
justifies postponing the hearing until after the event."' (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 379 (1971)). Examples of 'extraordinary situations' include seizure of contaminated foods
or drugs to protect the consumer and the collection of government revenues and seizure of enemy
property in wartime. See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 273 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part); State v. Karas, 32 P.3d 1016, 1019 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
("[T]he petitioner must allege that irreparable injury could result if an order is not issued
immediately."). In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) provides a sense of the narrow
circumstances in which such action may be taken. For example, 65(b) allows a judge to grant a
temporary restraining order (TRO) only if it clearly appears that "immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in
opposition." See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2)-(3). The TRO expires after ten days or less, and an
adversarial hearing must be scheduled "at the earliest possible time, taking precedence over all
other matters .... " Id.
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violence should be readily and easily available. 146 Nevertheless, applied
analysis of constitutional questions remain, as well as questions of whether the
statutory schemes are being appropriately followed. 147 This is especially true
when the ease of obtaining ex parte relief affords the abuser an opportunity to
abuse the order of protection scheme and unjustifiably obtain an order of
protection against the abused person in the relationship.148 If ex parte relief is
made too easy to obtain, the flimsiest allegations can support the entry of an ex
parte order excluding the abused from her home, depriving her of her children,
and putting her at a strategic disadvantage in later proceedings.1 49 Perhaps the
greater harm is caused when the abused person, against whom an improper ex
parte order is entered, loses faith in the judicial system as a mechanism to
protect her from abuse. 150 Several factors contribute to the circumstance
where the abused can have an ex parte order entered against her.
In order to make courts more easily accessible to victims of domestic
violence seeking an order of protection, especially those proceeding pro se,
many jurisdictions and court systems have adopted form pleadings. 15 1 The
forms simply require the checking of appropriate boxes and filling in blanks
with required information. These form pleadings can be a great assistance for
a person proceeding in good faith, but a tool for possible abuse for a person
seeking an order of protection in improper circumstances. 152 The forms often
146. See supra note 4.
147. See Hedrick-Koroll v. Bagley, 816 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). InBagley, the trial
judge issued an ex parte order of protection. Subsequently, a plenary order was entered "based
on the findings of this court... which were made orally for transcription." Id. at 852. However,
no transcript was created and no official record was created. Id. Under the statute, as an
alternative to making findings, the judge could have examined the petitioner under oath or
affirmation. Id. Because neither action was taken, the case was remanded on appeal. Id. at 853.
See also M.B. v. H.B., No. CS02-04668, 2003 De. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 15 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 2,
2003) (holding the husband's statements that he would "flip out" and "go out with a bang" if he
saw his estranged wife with someone else were insufficient grounds to grant an ex parte order of
protection where the statute required the petitioner to show that she has been subjected to "abuse"
by respondent); Los v. Los, 593 N.E. 2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding the trial court's grant of
an ex parte emergency order of protection was improper due to non-compliance with the statute's
notice requirement, the petitioner's failure to attach an affidavit to the original petition, and no
alleged exigent circumstances).
148. See supra note 10.
149. See supra note 11.
150. See, e.g., supra notes 28-30.
151. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(2)(c)(2) (West Supp. 2008) ("All clerk's offices
shall provide simplified petition forms for the injunction, any modifications, and the enforcement
thereof, including instructions for completion."). See also OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §60.3(A) (West
2003); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.710(5) (West Supp. 2008).
152. For example, in Radke ex rel. Radke v. Radke, 812 N.E.2d 9 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2004), the
Court found that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted an ex parte order of
protection where Petitioner sought to enjoin her ex-husband from "harassing" their teenage
daughter by unplugging the daughter's phone from the wall and using physical force to return her
to the house and to her room. Respondent's step-son testified to the effect that the daughter had
punched her father and kicked him in the groin, but that the father had refrained from striking her
while restraining her. Id. at 11.Without making a finding that abuse had occurred, the trial court
proceeded to issue a two-year plenary order of protection. Id. at 12. The Court noted that "an
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contain broad conclusionary language that establishes the constitutionally
required criteria for entering an ex parte order without notice or opportunity to
be heard. The forms frequently used in Illinois and approved by the
Conference of Chief Circuit Judges are illustrative.
Boilerplate language on the "Verified Petition for Order of Protection"
provides the justification for proceeding without notice:
I did not give the Respondent notice that I am seeking
protection because I fear that giving notice would result in
further abuse or because the abuse is likely to recur before I
return to court. Good cause exists for granting the remedy or
1 53
remedies requested without prior service of process or notice.
The form does not require any specific facts to support the circumstance that
allows for dispensing with notice to the opposing party. The language is
phrased in the alternative. The situation is either that notice would result in
abuse or abuse may recur before a hearing after notice. Those are different
circumstances, but a simple check of the box is all that is required to dispense
with notice. The Illinois Verified Petition also contains a "Remedies Section"
where the pleader seeks specific remedies and states the justification for it.154
In regard to jointly owned property, the forms allows for the awarding of
property by checking a box that states in part, "the balance of hardships favors
temporary possession by Petitioner," '1 55 and "the balance of hardships favors
156
granting this remedy."
Due process would seem to require more, if not in the pleading, at least an
inquiry and specific findings by the judge that the circumstances justify
proceeding without notice. 157 Nevertheless, the form "Emergency Order of
Protection" contains similar check boxes by which the judge entering the ex
parte order justifies the lack of notice to the respondent. 158 The judge may
order of protection is not the proper procedure for resolving child custody or visitation issues."
Id. at 13.
153. Circuit Court of Illinois, Verified Petition for Order of Protection, available at
www. 19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/forms/family/dv/OPPetitionLake_051107.pdf.
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id.
156. See Creaser v. Creaser, 794 N.E. 2d 990, (Ill. App. 2003). Illinois' Domestic Violence
statute requires, prior to the issuance of any order of protection, that the court consider two
factors: 1) the danger of further abuse and 2) hardship to the respondent. Where the court fails to
actually hear evidence regarding both factors, it is an abuse of discretion. In Creaser the court
accepted without inquiry the standard form pleading language concerning the first factor: "Both
parties have the right to occupancy; and, considering the risk of further abuse by Respondent
interfering with Petitioner's safe and peaceful occupancy, the balance of the hardships favors the
Petitioner because of the following relevant factors: Availability, accessibility, cost, safety,
adequacy, location, and other characteristics of alternative housing for each party and any minors
or dependents." The court stated flatly, "This is a conclusion for the court and not for the
petitioner." See also Verified Petition,supra note 153, at 5. But see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
60/217(a)(3)(ii) (West 1999).
157. See Creaser,794 N.E.2d 990.
158. Circuit Court of Illinois, Emergency Order of Protection, available at
http://www.19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/forms/family/dv/OPEmergencyOrder.Lake_051107.pdf.
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select from three different boilerplate paragraphs that are keyed to the remedy
sought. For the relief of possession of personal property, the court checks a
box that provides: "....
improper disposition of the personal property would
likely occur if the Respondent were given any prior notice,. . . or Petitioner
' 59
has an immediate and pressing need for the possession of that property.'
For the relief of granting exclusive possession of a shared residence, the
appropriate box to be checked states, ". . . the danger of further abuse ... [if]
Respondent was given any prior notice ... outweighs the hardships to
Respondent."' 160 A separate check box justifies a variety of forms of relief,
including a prohibition against further abuse, "possession" of minor children,
requiring appearance in court, prohibition against disposing of personal
property, with the language, "[t]he harm [prevented] would be likely to occur
if the Respondent were given prior notice ....,,161
The parsing of boilerplate in an attempt to support proceeding without
notice is curious, especially in light of the lack of any provision of specific
factual findings supporting proceeding without notice. What is lacking is a
finding that ensures proceeding without notice is constitutionally permissible.
This omission provides the opportunity for a person seeking an ex parte order
of protection for improper purposes to simply check a box and proceed without
62
having to provide factual justification for the relief sought. 1
Of course, it could be hoped or expected that judges would make
appropriate inquiry to determine whether proceeding cx parte is warranted.
Reliance on the expectation has several flaws. 163 The Respondent who has had
relief entered against him or her in a situation where it is not warranted has no
way of knowing the basis for the court's decision. With only a box checked,
there is no opportunity to ascertain whether the basis for the court proceeding
is based on real or fabricated facts. Therefore, the party cannot determine
whether there is a basis to seek immediate relief as provided for in many
statutes. 164 Additionally, no judge wants to be in the position of denying an

159. Id. at 3.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405 (N.J. 2003) (holding the trial court's granting of a
protection order was improper for lack of due process when the Plaintiff filled out a form
pleading incorrectly and testified to past domestic violence not alleged to on the form).
163. See, e.g., Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Wis. 1988). In this case, the court
states that the domestic violence "statute requires more than a conclusory claim that petitioner is
entitled to a restraining order." Id. at 764. The court then suggests that "[tlo ensure that
petitioners are aware that they must allege a risk of imminent harm, the state might consider
revising the simplified form it provides for petitions for ex parte restraining orders to make it
explicit that such an allegation is necessary." Id. at 768 n.9. The suggested language underscores
the problem: on the one hand, conclusory statements by the petitioner are undesirable but, on the
other hand, providing a checklist of required allegations necessarily facilitates the filing of
petitions containing such conclusions, rather than the specific facts and circumstances from which
a judge could make the requisite findings.
164. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/224(d) (West Supp. 2008) (allowing a
rehearing of an emergency order of protection upon two days notice).
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emergency order of protection to a person who is thereafter further abused. If
in doubt, the balance for the judge favors granting the requested temporary
relief. What is overlooked in that attitude is that harm can be done to the
person against whom an improper order has been granted. In the scenarios
discussed from our law school clinic, our clients came to the office greatly
discouraged. After having been abused at home, now they felt abused by the
courts and had a tendency to want to give up. One client did proceed with
challenging the improper order and gaining back access to her home and
children. The other did not.
VII.

THE ULTIMATE ASSURANCE OF DUE PROCESS: CONSCIENTIOUS
JUDGES

While domestic violence statutes generally comply with due process, it is,
of course, in the application that the important rights can be violated. It is
incumbent upon judges to look beyond conclusionary allegations of irreparable
injury. If there is no actual risk of imminent harm, the adjudication of relief
should await notice and hearing. Similarly, the judge must scrutinize the
factual circumstances to make sure the alleged victim has in fact suffered
abuse justifying relief. If ex parte relief is warranted, the judge should
scrutinize the relief sought to see if all remedies should be adjudicated at the ex
parte stage. For example, an ex parte order, in appropriate circumstances,
could order the abuser to stay away from the victim, but await resolution of
other issues for a hearing after notice. The key is for the judge to parse the ex
parte relief that is necessary to protect the victim from further abuse, but at the
same time afford the alleged abuser an opportunity for a hearing before
resolving non-critical issues that do not impact matters of immediate safety. It
is the lack of this scrutiny, or the knee jerk granting of one hundred percent of
the petitions that set the stage for easy abuse of the process that is intended to
prevent abuse.
In the composite situations, judicial scrutiny would have easily revealed
that the allegations of abuse rested on the most flimsy of grounds: a large man
scared of his diminutive wife and a minor push of a man by a woman during an
argument. Even if arguably construed to meet the statutory definition of abuse,
there certainly is no risk of immediate, irreparable injury that would warrant
granting relief without notice. Giving each of these women a day in court
before excluding them from their children and homes would have prevented a
gross abuse of the very statutes enacted to protect them.
VII. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence statutes were enacted with the laudable purpose of
providing an easily assessable means of judicial relief to a vulnerable segment
of society. To remain effective, the ease of access must not be exploited by
persons who use the system to obtain unwarranted relief. While the statutory
schemes facially survive constitutional scrutiny, it is in application that their
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procedural protections may fall short. It is incumbent upon courts to treat
orders of protection as they would any other request for ex parte relief and
ensure that relief be granted only when necessary to prevent the risk of
immediate and irreparable injury. When that risk of injury is not present,
notice and hearing should precede issuance of an order.
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APPENDIX
State

Who
Requests WhoIssues How Obtained Form/Name What
Must BeSet Requirement for
Definition of
of Order
Forth InPetition?/ Risk of Immediate / Abuse/Violence
Conclusoryform? Irreparable Harmto

Alaska

Victim
oradult circuit or
household district court
mem. onbehalf
ofminor

Alaska

victim
or parentdistrict
or
Petition
ex parte
orguardian
on superior
court establishing
protective
behalf
ofminor
probable
causeorder /
orpeace
officer
that crime
of emergency
DVhas
protective
occurred. order
Certify
in
writing
any
efforttonotify
D.

Adz

peace
officer, judge, JOP,
victim
-blood magistrate
or
relation
or
commissioner
related
by court
order,
or
marnage
or live
together

Ark

victim

Calif

police
officer, judicial
officer
sheriff
officer,
HwyPatrol,
Univof CA
police,
Cal.
State Police,
DeptofParks
andRec,
Housing
Auth
Patrol Officer,
Victim
-close
relationship
police
officer municipal
when
court
court of
closed, victim record
other
timescurrent
or
former
relation,
orliving
with or
involved
in
intimate
rel.

Grant Ex Parte

swor
testimony

temporary
protection
order

petition
alleging
immediate and
abuseby defendant present
danger
of
abuse

attempting
to cause
or
intentionally, knowing
or recklessly causing
physical injury.
Placing
someonein
fearofimminent,
senous physical injury
by physical
menace

V mustestab
thata stated
as such only
crimeinvolving DV whenpeace
officer
hasoccurred andV requests
protective
mustbeprotected,order
Peace
Officer:court
finds probable
cause
tobelieve thatV isin
immediate
danger of
DVbased
on
allegation ofrecent
commission
ofcrime

crimeagainst person,
burglary,
criminal
trespass,
arson
or
crimneglburning,
crimmischief, terrorist
threatening,
violating
ProtOrder,
harassment

involving DV.

peaceofficer ex parte
allegation ofrecent immediate
and
states
reas. emergency incident of DV
present
danger
of DV
grounds
to
order of
believe personprotectionindanger.
victim may
Victim,
verified seek orderof
petition
if life protection,
or health
isin injunction
imminent (avail for
danger
dissolution of
marnage)
or
injunction
against

endangerment,
threats,
intimidation,
assault,
aggrav
assault, unlawful
impris,
kidnapping,
trespass, criminal
damage
disorderly
conduct,
telephone
harassment,
harassment,
stalking,
surrept photo, video,
filmingsexual
exploit
ofchild

harassment

Colo

circuitcourt swom
statement

ex parte
temporary
order of
protection

LEOasserts Expare
reas.
grounds emergency
tobelieve
protective
person
in
order
immed &
obtained by
present
danger LEO
ofDV

verified
complaint

immed & present physical
harm,
bodily
danger of DAor R injury
or assault
scheduled
to be
released
from
incarceration wiin30
days andImmed &
presentdanger or DA
immed & present "abuse"
danger of DV

Temporary
Temporary
CPO imminent
danger
act orthreatened
act
civil protection
maybeissuedif
exists toperson
of violence
order or
imminent
danger
seeking
protection
emergency
exists
to persons
protection
seeking
order.When
order (after courtnotinsession
hours)
apeaceofficer
must
assert reas.
grounds
tobelieve anadult is
in immediate
and
present
danger
of
domestic
abuse.
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Nature of Relief
Granted Ex Parte:
is it more limited
than a regular OP?
suchas thecourt
deemsnecessary
to
protecttheP from
abuse or immediate
andpresent danger
of abuse.No
distinction from
regularprotection
order
ex parteprotect.
Orderand
emergency
protect.
Orderlimit relief

EXPARTE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORDERS

Ex Part OP
ExpirationDate
_

_Earlier

n/a

emergency
protective
order
expires in 72 hours
/ ex parte
protective order
expires in 20 days

Post Deprivation Length of Time
Hearing
TROIs In Effect/
Available?
Opportunityor
Hearing?
notstated
hearingrequired
within 10days

uponrequestby
eitherptywith 3
daysor shorter
notice

formsof relieflimited close of nextday of
fromregularOP
judicial
business
unlesscontinued

all ordersavail under
regularop.

protective
order,
temp.care and
controlofminor
child,contact,
excludefrom
dwelling

sameaspermanent
restraining orderto
preventDA

notstated

Sanctions for Other?
False
Petition?
wherewrongful
actioninstituted
D hassame
rights,
remediesand
DPas an D in
other
civilcriminal
action

Sol

procedures
same forex
parteand
regular
protectionorder.

either partymay
request
dissolution
or
hearingbefore
expiration

note distinction
between
requirements
whenpeace
officeror victim
requests
protective order.

Whenrequested
byDefendant

has a criminal
procedure
for
obtaining ex
parte op. States
on facethatD is
entltledto a
hearingon
writtenrequest.
Differentactions
availfor
dissolution of
marriage..

NLT30 days

close of judicial
businesson 5th
court day following
issuance or 7th
calendar day

hasdifferent
orders
dependingon
type ofrelief

not stated

NLT 14days

notstated

DAis subset of no sol
largerCivil
protectionorder
statute. Not
treated
separately as in
somestates.
temporary
restraining
order
avail fordivorce
proceedings
different from
emergency
order, see 1410-108
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State

WhoRequests WhoIssues

Definition of
AbuselI/iolence

Conn

Victim

How Obtained Form/Name WhatMust Be Set Requirement for
of Order
Forth In Petition?/ Risk of Immediate /
Conclusoryform? Irreparable Harmto
Grant Ex Parte
superior court affidavitunder Expartecourt allegation ofimmed immed& present
oath
order
& presentdangerto physicaldanger to
applicant
applicant

continuous threatof
presentphysicalpain
or physical injury

Del

victim,Divof
ChildProtec
Serv Divof
AdultProtect
Serv.

court

DC

victim,related family division
byblood,legal
custody,
marriage,
child
in common,
shared
residence
or
romanticrel,
notnecess.
Sexual OR by
corporation
counsel
victimor family circuit court
or household
personor
person with
reasonable
causeto
believehe/ she
maybecomea
victimof an act
of DV

uponreferral temp
by USatty or protection
application
order
underoath

intentionally or
recklessly causing or
attempting
to cause
physical injuryor a
sexualoffense,
damaging,
destroying
gottaking tangible
prop,engagingin a
courseofalarmingor
distressing conduct
whichis likely to
provokea violentof
disorderly response,
trespassing, child
abuse,unlawful
imprisonment,
kidnapping
notdefined

GA

petitioner??

verifiedpetition temp reliefex allege specific facts NO
alleging
parte
thatprobablycause
specificfacts
exists to establish
thatFV has occurred
in the pastandmay
occurin thefuture

HI

victimor family family court
or household judge
member

FL

court

affidavit or
verified
pleading

swornpetition
alleging
existenceof
DV

affidavitunder
oathor
statement
madeunder
penally of
perjury

emergency
protective
order

temp
injunction for
protection
against
domestic
violence

allegation of
immed &present
immediateand
danger to petitioner,
presentdangerto
childor infirmadult
petitioner, minor
childof petitioneror
infirmadult

plaintiff'ssafety or
welfareimmed
endangered
by Resp

marksections
immed &present
containing
dangerof DVexists
conclusions, fill in
blankswith details of
incidentandlocation

ex partetemp writtenpetition
restraining alleging pastact's)of
order
abuse,threatof
abusemake
probableabuseis
imminent,cite
specific factsand
circumstances

NO---probablethat
actsofabuseare
imminentor extreme
psychological abuse
or maliciousproperty
damageis imminent

assault,battery,
sexualbattery,
stalking, kidnapping,
false imprisonment,
or
anycriminaloffense
resultingin physinjury
or death

Familyviolence =
battery,simple
battery,simple
assault, stalking,
criminaldamageto
propertyor ceminal
trespass
physical harm,bodily
injury, assault threat
or imminentphysical
harm,extreme
psychological abuse,
maliciousproperty
damage.
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Natureof Relief
Ex Part OP
Granted Ex Parte : Expiration Date
is it more limited
than a regular OP?
sameas permanent
restraining
orderto
preventDA

Post Deprivation Length of Time Sanctions for
Hearing
TROIaIn Effect! False
Available?
Opportunity or Petition?
Earlier Hearing?
not stated
NLT14 days
either ptycan
postponefor good
cause

sameas protective
order

maybe,protective within10days of
ordermaybe
ex partehearing,
modifiedor
mayextendNTE
rescinded
during 30 days
its termupon
motionandnotice
to allparties anda
hearing.

reliefavail for
temporaryprotect
ordernotstated

not morethan 14
days

not stated

restraining
R from
committing actsofV,
tempexclusiveuse
andpossession or
resid, tempcustody
of minorchildren

NTE15 days /P
or D maypetition
courttomodifyor
dissolve injunction
at any time

asthe court deems
necessary to protect
petitioneror minor
fromviolence

not stated

within10days of
filingpetition,NLT
30 daysafterfiling
petition

nodistinction
betweentemporary
andextended
restraining
order

not stated

earliestdate
businessof the
courtwittpermit,
NLT15 days from
date of TRO, may
be continued
up
to 90 days or until
service is
effected.

Other?

Sol

caretaker
providing shelter
in his/her
residence to
person60 years
old or older may
notbe enjoined
from fulluse of
propertyfl

petitionfor temp
order mustbe
accompanied
by
petitionfor civil
protectionfor
order to last 14
days

criminal
complaint or civil
injunction.
Whenonly
groundfor denial
in no
appearance
of
an immed &
presentdanger
of abusethen
court shallset a
full hearingwith
noticeat earliest
.possible time

not morethan
2 yearsfrom
dateof the right
to maintain
action
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State

WhoRequests WhoIssues

Idaho

victim,family
member,
household
member

court

How Obtained Form/Name WhatMust Be Set
of Order
Forth In Petition?/
Conclusoryform?
swornaffidavit
ortestimony at
ex pare
hearing

ex parte
temporary
protection
order

victimwho is circuit court
familyor
household
member,dating
relationship

verifiedpetition ex prte
emergency
or petition
accompanied order of
protection.It
by affidavit
appears30
day interim
OP may be
granted ex
prte.

personwho is
or hasbeen
victim

any courtof
record

petitionthat
order for
domesticor
protection ex
familyviolence pere
has occurred

Iowa

plaintiff??

court

petition

Kan

victimor
court
someoneon
behalfofminor

Ken

anyfamily
or
member
member
or
unmarnied
couple

LA

petition
familymember any court
empowered
to containing
hearfamily or affidavit,
juvenile
mafers

Id

distrct court

domesticor family
violence has
occurred

temporary
not stated
protective
order issued
sxparle.
Emergency
order avail
when court
notin session
verifiedpetition emergency
order or
temporary
order issued
ex parte

Definitionof
Requirement for
Risk of Immediate / Abuse/iolence
IrreparableHarm to
Grant ExParte
'irreparable injury'
physicalinjury,sexual
-from DV could result abuse,forced
iforder notissued
imprisonment
immed w/out notice,
situations where
Resp.has recently
threatened
bodily
injury or engagedin
actsof violence
_against petitioner
court shallexamine phys abuse,
harassment,
petitioner. It if
appeared thecontents intimidation of a
ofthe petition and
dependent,
examination
of
interference
withpers
petitioner thatthe
liberty
are
averments
sufficient to indicate
abuseby respand
supportgrantingof
reliefunder emerg
OP. Harm remedy
intendedto prevent
mouldbe likely to
occur if the respwere
given priornoticeor
greaternoticethan
given of petiteffortsto
obtain judicial relief
NO---finding that DV attempting to causeor
or FV hasoccurredis causingphysharmto
another fam or
sufficient to justify
order- meansResp householdmem.,
represents
a credible placinglamor
threat to safety of Pet householdmem.in
or mem.of household fear of phys harm,
invol.Sex
Presentdanger of DA assault between
family mem.s

willfully attempting to
immed& present
dangerof abuseto P causebodilyinjury or
willfully or wantonly
or minorchild
causinginjury, placing
anotherin fear of
imminentbod. Inj.
Underagesexual
contact
Presenceof an
physinj,serious phys
verifiedpetition emergency factsand
inj, sexabuse,
protective
circumstances which immed & present
dangerof DVand
assault, or infliction of
order
constituted the
alledg.DVand
abuse
fear of imminentphys
abuse. Forms
inj, etc.
temporary
restraining
order

immed & present
facts and
circumstances
dangerof abuse
concerning alleged
abuse

physor sexualabuse
+ offenseagainst
persn
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Nature of Relief
Ex Part OP
Granted Ex Parte : Expiration Date
is it more limited
than a regular OP?
noapparent
difference
from
regularprotection
order.

relieflimited,court
uses tests to
determineextentof
relief, No
counseling, legal
custody, paymentof
$$

Post Deprivation Length of Time Sanctions for
Hearing
TROIs In Effect/ False
Available?
Opportunityor Petition?
Earlier Hearing?
if ex parteorder 14 days,hearing
substantially
maybe held by
affectsD's rights telephone,
to enterdomicile
or rightto custody
or if endsof
justice so require,
D can moveto
shortentime.

Emergency
orders: upon 2 days
Not less than 14
noticeor shorter,
nor morethan 21 respmayappear
days. Interim
andpetitioncourt
ordersup to 30
to re-hearthe
days. IForder
originalor
grantedpossessionamendedpetition.
andresp seeks to Mustallegeresp
reopenor vacate didnot receive
grantthen hearng priornoticeo
14days.
initialhearingand
resp had
meritorious
defenseto order
or remedies

noapparent
2 yearsunless
differenceex partsI anotherdate id
regular
orderedby the
court

at eitherpartys
Upto 2 years
request- notmore
than30 daysafter
servicecourtmust
setheanngdate
within 30 days

noapparent
differenceex parte/
regular

Sol

irreparable
injury "= recent
threatsof bodily
injuryor
engagedin acts
of DV against
petitioner.

note:cnminalop
hashigher
standardfor
issuanceined and
presentdanger
of abuseto
petitioner also,
emergorder
extends 14 days
only.

reliefmaynot
be denied
becauseof
lapseof time
betweenact of
DV or FVand
filing pet

notlessthan 5
and notmorethan
15daysafter
commencing
proceeding.
Emergency
order
avail ex parte
expiresin 72 hrs
within20 days of
filing

ex parte relieflimited emergency order
expires in 72 hrs or
whencourtis avail.

ex parterelieflimited timefixed in order notstated
NTE14 days

no apparent
difference ex party/
regular

alleg and
denials made
w/o reas.
causeand
found to be
untruesubject
pry pleading
themto
paymentof
reas.expenses
incurredby
otherpry and
atty fee. May
be forwardedto
states alty for
prosecfor
perury. Does
not apply to
criminalcourt
proceedings.

Other?

periodoftime
fixed in order NTE
14dayscan be
reissuedfor 14
days ifservice not
effected.
notspecifically
hearing set within any false
intentof legto
TRO,but court
10daysof
statement
provide civil
maymodifyorder grantingTRO
under oath
remedyforDV
on motionof any
contained in
which will afford
party
the affidavit = V immed and
perjury
easily accessible
punishable by protection
fine andprison
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How Obtained Form/Name WhatMust Be Set
Forth In Petition?/
of Order
Conclusoryform?

Requirement for
Risk of Immediate /
Irreparable Harmto
Grant ExPare
and
immediate
presentdanger of
abusetoP or minor
child

State

WhoRequests WhoIssues

Maine

distrct court affidavit
an adultwho
or tribalcourt
hasbeen
abusedby a
familyor
household
memberor
person
responsible
for
childwhohas
beenabused

Md

victim

district or
circuitcourt

Mass

person
suffering from
abusefroman
adultor minor
familyor
household
mer. substantive
datingor
engagement
relationship
or
relation
spouse,former
spouse,indiv.
In dating
relationship,
ndiv residing
or hadresided
with

superiorcourt complaint
or Boson
municipal
courtor
probateand
family courtor
courthaving
venueover
residor
household

orderof
protection
issuedex
parte

not stated

immediatedangerof
abuse

family division verified
of circuitcourt complaintor
affidavit

personal
protection
order

specific facts

immediateand
irreparableinjury, loss
or damagewill result
fromdelay requiredto
effectuatenoticeor
thatnotice will itself
adverse
precipitate
actionbeforea pers
protectordercan be
issued

Minn

familyor
household
member,
guardian

courthaving swamaffidavit
jrisdiction
over
dissolution
actions

Miss

victim,parent,
adult
household
mem., next
friendof
abusedperson

chancery
court,justice
court,
municipal
courtcounty
court

Mich

petitionunder
oath

temporary
protection
order

uniform form.

temporaryex natureandextent of NO- personeligible
forreliefhasbeen
abuse
pare
abused
protective
order

Definition of
Abuse/Violence

attempting tocauseor
causing budinj or
offensive phys
contact. Threatening,
harassingtormenting
behavior, compelling
personby threat or
to
force or intimidation
engage in conduct,
restrictingsubt.
of person,
Movements
communicating threat
to commitcrimeof
violence against
person,repeatedly
andw/o cause
followingP or beingat
or in thevicinity of P
home,sch, business
actthat causes
seriousbodharm,
placingpersonin fear
ofimminentserious
bodharm,assault,
rape,false imprison

to causeor
attempting
causingphysharm,
placing anotherin fear
ofimminentserious
phys harm. Sex rel by
force,threat, duress

physical harm,bOdinj,
immediate
and
specific facts and
circumstances from presentdanger of DZ assault, infliction of
fearof phys harm,
whichreliefis sought
budinj or assault,
terroristic threats, crim
sexconduct,
with
interference
emer.call
attempting to cause or
and
petitionsigned temporaryex generaldescription immediate
inten, know,reck,
presentdangerof
parteorder offacts and
underoath
abuse
causing budinj,
circumstances
placing another in fear
concerning alleged
by phys menaceor
abuseneedfor
threat
immediateprotective
orders
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Nature of Relief
Ex Part OP
Granted Ex Parte : ExpirationDate
is it morelimited
than a regular OP?
ex pare relieflimited

Post Deprivation Length of Time Sanctions for Other?
Hearing
TROIsIn Effect I False
Available?
Opportunity or Petition?
Earlier Hearing?
upon2 days
hearingmustbe
noticeor shorter heldw/in 21 days
noticeto P D may of filingcomplaint
appearandmove
the dissolution or
modifor order. P
hasburdenof
justifying finding in
ex parleorderthat
D challenges

ex parterelieflimited

'In general- a
respshallhavean
opportunity to be
heardon the
question of
whetherthe court
should issue a
P.O

effective notmore
than 7 daysafter
service oforder,
Courtmayextend
NTE30 days to
effectuateservice,
provide
protection,
other
good cause
courtshallgiveD NLT10court
notstated
opportunity to be businessdays
heard
aftertemporary
orderentered

limited,no perm
custody, support,
compensation

no distinction
betweenex parte
andregular

no apparent
restriction

182days

personrestrained
mayfile motionto
modifyor rescind
andrequest
hearingwithin 14
daysafterorder
served. Hearing
tobe heldwfin 14
daysunlessreap
is licensedto
carrygunfor
work,then
hearingw/in 5
days if enjoined
frompossessing
gun.

effective for fixed
period set by court,
If persserv not
madew/in 14or 28
days of issuance,
(dep on whether P
requestshearing)
order expires
termination
notstated
dependson nature
of grantingcourt.
Either5 or 10 days

specialfactors
are considered
in ordering
vacation of
home

indivknowinglyseparatesection
and
for personal
intentionally
protection orders
makesfalse
for stalking.
statement
to
thecourtin
supportof
petitionfor pers
protectorderis
subjectto
contempt
powersofcourt

No hearing
required.D may
requesta heaing

Sol

notstated
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State

Mont

Nev

NH

NJ

NM

NY

Definition of
Requirement for
Risk of Immediate / Abuse/Violence
Irreparable Harm to
Grant Ex Parte
assault, aggrassault,
familymember court
swornpetition temporary
petitionstatingV in victimin reas.
reas.apprehension apprehension
of bod intimidation,
partnerof
victim.Non
order of
of bodinjor victim injor is victim of listed fam mem.assault,
familyif victim
protection
offense andis in
crim endangerment,
of stalking,
issued without
dangerof harmif
negl.endangerment,
partneror fam
notice
courtdoesnot issuea assault on a minor,
mem. of victim
tempOP immediately assault w/weapon,
of deliberate
unlawfulrestr,
homicide,
kidnapping,
aggrav
parent,
guardian
kidnapping
arson.
batery, assault,
spouse,
courtor
verifiedpetition temporary specific facts - actof actof DVhas
orderof
DV hasoccurredor occurredor threatof compelling
another by
relative,tam
Master
forceto
protection
thereexists a threat oneoccurringexists
mem., dating (attorney
peorm/refrain from
rel,person
licensedto
issuedwithout of DV
notice performing
act, sex
w/whom one practicein
state)
injunction
assault, know,purp,
hasa child
reck,courseof
conductintendedto
harassthe otherstalking, arson,
trespassing, larceny,
destr of priv prop,
carrying
concealed
weep w/o permit,false
imprison,unlawful
entryto residor
forcible entry
familyor
district courts sworn petition temporary
allegationof abuse immedand present assaultor reckless
conduct,crim
household
and family
allegingabuse order of relief by D
dangerof abuse
threatening,
ex
members
division
byD
assault, interference
withfreedom,destof
property,unauthentry
harassment
WhoRequests WhoIssues

How Obtained Form/Name WhatMust Be Set
Forth In Petition?/
of Order
Conclusory form?

victim,18or
familypartof
older,spouse, chancerydiv
formerspouse, of superior
presentof
courtor
former
municipal
household
courtjudge if
off hours
mem.,any
personwith
whomhaschild
in common,
dating
relationship
victimof DA
court

sworn
testimony or
complaint

ex parte
temporary
restraining
order

LEOsworn
written
statementI
petitionunder
oath
accompanied
bysworn
affidavit

ex parts
EMERGENCY
- law petitioner or
physharm,sever
emotdistress, bod inj
emergency enfofficer muststate petitioners childin
orderof
to thecourt in
immed dangerof DA or assault, threat
followingan incident causingimminentfear
protection//
person(phoneor
Temporary fax)andfile a sworn of DAbya household of bod injby
householdmem.,crim
order of
writtenstatement
member
trespass,crimdmgto
protection
settingforththe
prop,repeatedly driv
issued ex
needfor an
byresor work place,
parte
emergency
orderof
protection
telephone
harassment,
stalking,
TEMPORARYharassment,
harmor
specific facts
showingallegedDA
threatenedharmto
children

spouse,
former family courts petition
spouse,parent, andcriminal
child,mem.of courtshave
samefamily or concurrent
household, (uris.
authagency,
assoc, socor
instit,peace
officeror police
officer,person
on court's
motion

temporary
order of
protection
issued ex
parte

P in danger of DV

not stated?l?l
standardform,
appearsto be very
conclusory- line
throughconductthat
doesnot pertaint

homicide,asssault,
terroristic threats,
kidnapping, criminal
restraint,false
imprison,sexassault,
crimsexcontact,
lewdness,crim
mischief,burglary,
crimtrespass,
harassment,stalking

disorderly conduct,
harassment
in 1st
deg,2nddeg,stalking
in 2nd, 3rd,menacing,
reckless
endangerment,
assault, attempted
assault betwspouses,
formerspouses,
parentand childor
mem.sofsamefamor
household

2008]

TAYLOR:

EXPARTE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORDERS

ExPart OP
Natureof Relief
Granted ExParte : Expiration Date
is it more limited
than a regular OP?
no restriction

Post Deprivation Length of Time Sanctions for Other?.
TROIs In Effect/ False
Hearing
Opportunityor Petition?
Available?
Eartier Hearing?
respondent
may 20 days
requestemer.
hearing before
endof20 daysby
filingaffidavit that
demonstrates
urgentneed.
Hearingsetw/in3
workingdays

temporaryrelief
limited(no support
or visitation)

yes,with2 days NRS33.080
NTE30 days, as
noticeto other
pty,adverseparty courtfixes.
mayappear and
movedissolution
or modification.
Hearingto be held
expeditiously

no restriction unless visitation
wherespecial
criteria are applied

if ordermadeby
telephone,
one
day.

relieflimited

relieflimited

relieflimited

emergency
- 72
hours

yes,3 - 5 days
win request

wn 30 days or
filing or wiin 10
days of service,
whichever is later

antemporder
immediately
for
appealable
plenaryhearing
de novo

orderremainsin
effectuntilfurther
orderissued

emer.- YESat
anytime. //
not
Temporary,
stated

emergencyorder
maybe appealed
as soonas the
judicial day
following the
issuance ofthe
orderI
TEMPORARY
either party may
requesta review
hearingtoamend
the orderhearingheldw/in
10 days ofissuing
temp order.

anyperson
filing petition
containing false
allegations of
abuseshall be
subject to
criminal
penaties

Sol

lengthof time
betweenthe
abusive
incident and
Ihepet
application for
OPis
'irrelevant'.

courtnotbound
by technical
rulesof evidence
andmayadmit
evidence which
it considers
relevantand
material.

familycourt
proceeding is
civil forpurpose
to
of attempting
stop violence,
end disruption
and obtain
protection.
Criminal
is for
proceeding
purposeof

prosecution
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State

WhoRequests WhoIssues How Obtained Form/Name WhatMust Be Set Requirement for
Definition of
of Order
Forth In Petition?/ Risk of Immediate / AbuseViolence
Conclusory form? Irreparable Harm
to

ND

familyor
distrct court verified
household
application
members

Grant ExParle

exparle
allege existence of
temporary
DV
protection
order

Ohio

familyor
dora reldiv of petition
household court of
members common
pleas, courtof
common
pleas

OK

family
district court petition
under emergency
ex descoption of what
/household
oath
parteorder happened
membersvictimofDA,
victimof
stalking, victim
or harassment,
policeofficer

Ore

anyperson circuit court petition
made
whohasbeen
under
oathor
victimofabuse
affirmation
win preceding
180 days

immediate
and
present
danger
ofDV
toapplicant based
on
allegof recent

phys harm,
bodinj,
compelled sex
activity, assault, inflict
offearofimminent

incidentofactualDV

physharm,bodint.

ex parte
description ofthe immed &present
temporary nature andextent
of danger
- situations
protection
DV
where
Resphas
order
threatened
family
or
household
mem.,
sit
where
Reshas
threatened
famor
household
mem.,
or
Resp haspreviously
been
convicted ofor
pledguilty to offense
thatconstitutes DV

DV= attempting
to
cause orrecklessly
causing bod inj,
placing
another
infear
ofimminent
serious
physharm.OPalso
avail forfelonious
assault, aggravated
assault, assault,
menacing
by stalking,
aggravated
trespass,
viol ofsimilar
municipal
ord

immed andpresent any actofphysharm
danger ofDA,stalking or threat of imminent
orharassment
physharmcommitted
byadult.Relief
also
avail forstalking,
harassment

allegation of abuse immed &present attempt
tocause or
inpreceding
180 danger
offurther
intent,
know,reck
days, particularly
abuse
fromthe
causing bedinj,
describing thenatureabuser
-includes intentionally knowor
ofthe abuse and situations inwhich
the reckplacing
another
dates
thereof.
Resphasrecently infearof imminent
threatened
petitioner serious bodinj,
withadditional bod causing another to
harm
engage
in nvolsexby
force or threat of force

2008]

TAYLOR:

EX PARTE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORDERS

Nature of Relief
ExPart OP
Granted Ex Parte: ExpirationDate
is itmorelimited
than a regular OP?
relieflimited- does 30 days
notinclude rec
counseling, requiring
supportpymt,
awardingtempuse
of personal
prop
(auto)
no restriction

relieflimited- not
Inl award of atty
fees,courtcosts,
counseling

police officer
requestedOP
expiresnext day
court open for
business

Relieflimited,must Oneyear
havehearng to
award custody,
requireeitherptyto
movefromfam res
wheretitle held
jointly, assess arty
feesandcosts

Post Deprivation Length of Time Sanctionsfor Other?
Sol
Hearing
TROIs In Effect / False
Available?
Opportunity or Petition?
Earlier Hearing?
_
not stated
hearingsetwfin allegof DV
14 days of issuing false and not
order
madein good
faith,pty
making alleg
shallpay court
costsand reas.
aty fees of
responding
pty
not stated
CRIM:courtshall
notedistinction
conducta hearing
betweenhearing
as soon as poss
requirements
for
after expale
cnminal andcivil
orderissued,
protection
NLTnextday on
ordersl OHIO
which courtis
COURTMAY
scheduled to
REQUIRE
conduct business.
BOND- ONLY
CIVIL: courtshall
ONEINUS??
schedule full
hearingw/in7
days after
grantingpetition if
reliefincluded
possessofresid.
If othertypeof
relief,then 10
days.
not stated
hearingwin 15 unlawfulto
days offiling
seek protec
petition
orderagainst
spouse or ex
spouseforpurp
of harassment,
undue
advantage,
intimidation,
or
limitationof
childvisit rights
in any div
proceeding or
separation w/o
ust cause.
Violator guilty
of
misdemeanor:
1year jail,
$5,000.
Second
offense, 2 yr,
$20,(0
if resprequests
NOTE:ALL
hearingit shallbe
HEARINGS
ARE
heldwio21 days
EXPARTEAND
followingthe
HELDONDAY
request
OFFILINGPET
ORDAYAFTER
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State

WhoRequests WhoIssues How Obtained Form/Name What
Must BeSet Requirement for
Definition of
of Order
Forth InPetition?/ Risk ofImmediate / Abuse!Violence
Conclusory form?Irreparable Hann to

Penn

family
or
cou
household
members,
sexual
or
intimate
partners
or
persons
who
share
biological
parenthood

Grant Ex Parte

RI

SC

SD

petition

allegation of
immed
&present
immediate
and
danger ofabuse
to P
present
danger
of or minor
child
abuse
to P orminor
child

attempting
tocause
o
know,
reckcausing
hodinj,
rape,invol
deviate SI,sex
assault, statsex
assault, aggravated
indecent
ass, indec
assault or incest,
placing another in
fear ofimminent
bud
inj,false impxs, phys
orsex
abuseofminor,
knowing
engaging
in
course ofconduct
or
repeatedly committing
actstoward
another
under
circum.
which
place person
in fear
of bodinj
tanmem., family court complaint
with temporary
specific facts
immed
andirrep
attempting
tocause
or
subst. dating
affidavit
or
order granted
injury, lossor damagecausing phys harm,
tel,
verified
expare
willresult
totheP
placing another in fear
complaint
before
notice can be ofimmin. serious
phys
served
anda hearingharm,
causing another
held
toengage
invol
insex
rel
byforce, threatof
force
or duress
family
or
familycourt
or venfied
petition order of
allege existence of emergency
hearing physharm,bodinj,
household
magistrate
protection
abuse
to familyor
avail w/primafacie assault or threatof
members after
hours
household member.showing
ofimmed physharm,
sexcrim
Must
state the
andpresent
danger of offense committed
specific time,place bodinj,maybe
against
tammem.
details
ofabuse
and verified
by supporting
otherfacts
and
affidavits
circum.
upon which
reliefis sought
family
or
circuit
courtor petition
exparte
allege DAandstate allegofimmed
and physharm,badinj
or
household
magistrate accompanied temporary
specific facts and irreparable
injury,
loss inflict offear of
members court
byaffidavit
protection
circum.
oftheDA or damage
willresult imminent
phys harm
made
under order
before
advpty or his or badinj
oath
atty canbeheardin

Tenn.

carrent/former
anycourtof swompetition exparteorderalleg
DAby
spouses,
liverecord
with
ofprotection respondent
together,
urisdiction
dating,
overdomestic
relatives,
rel
matters,
relatives
by
gen
session
marriage court,
jud
commissioner
s,
magistrates,
otherswith

TX

adultmer. of court
famor
household,
adultmem.of
dating
rel,
prosec.
atty,
deptofprotect
andregulatory
services,

authohty

application
under
oath

temporary ex
parte
protective
order

opposition

immed
andpresent inflicting or attempting
danger ofDAto
toinflict phys. injury
petitioner
onan adult or minor
by otherthan
accidental means.
Placing
adult or minor
in fearofphys harm,
physrestraint,
or
malicious
ding topers
property
ofabused
pty.

detailed description clear andpresent
offacts andcircum. danger offars
concerning alleged violence
tamviolence, and
needfor
the
immediate
protective
order

actintended toresult
inphys harm,
bodinj,
assault, sex
assault or
thatisathreat
places farmem.
in
fear
ofimmin. phys
harm,badini,assault,
or sex
assault, abuse,
dating
violence

2008]

TAYLOR.: EX PARTE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORDERS

Natureof Relief
Granted Ex Parte:
is it more limited
than a regular OP?
relieflimited- no
custody, financial
supp,

Ex Part OP
Expiration Date

relieflimited- no
support

21 daysor thatthe notstated
courtfixes

at hearingparty
requesting
temp
ordermust
proceedwith
complaint, or
temporder
dissolved

relieflimited forOP
issuedafter
emergencyhearing.
After hearing,
custody, fin support,
person prop,award
costsandartyfees

notreallyclear.
OP canlast 60
days, nothing
specific for ex
partel!

NO EXPARTE
OP?!?!?

Relieflimited- no
custody, temp
support,counseling

30 days

remainsin effect
untilmodifiedor
terminatedbythe
court after notice
andhearing

Post Deprivation Length of Time
Hearing
TROIs In Effect!
Available?
Opportunityor
Earlier Hearing?
notstated
w/in 10 days of
filing

Sanctions for Other?
False
Petition?
!
personwho
know gives
false info to
LEFwithintent
to implicate
another
commits
offense under
(false reportsto
LEF)

generally, court
maymodifyterms
of existing order
upon application

relieflimited- no
15 days
possesof residence
by eviction, provision
ofalt housing,
custody fin support,
counseling

notstated

relieflimited.
Specialreqtsiforder
excludespty from
residence

indivaffectedmay NTE20 days,
filea motionat
maybe extended
any timeto
on requestof
vacate. Hearing applicant or
set ASAP
court'smotion

15 daysof service
of orderon Resp

all petfiledpro
se shallbe
liberally
construed in
favor ofthe
petitionerd!

necessity for
bondmaybe
dispensed with
for exparte.
Courtmay
recesshearing
on Tempex
parteto contact
resp byphone
andprovide
opportunity to be
presentwhen
hearing
resomesl

Sol

131
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State

WhoRequests Wholssues

UT

cohabitant
districtcourt written,verified ex parte
subjectedto
petition
protective
tamviolence order
notethereis a
differencefor
civiland
criminal

VA

familyor
household
member

Wash

W.Va.

W

MODEL

any judgeof
cir court,gen
dist court,
juvenile and
domesticrel
dist courtor
magistrate

How Obtained Form/Name WhatMust Be Set
of Order
Forth In Petition?/
Conclusoryform?

LEOor
emergency
allegedly
protective
abusedperson order
assertionunder
oath

Requirement for
Risk of Immediate /
Irreparable Harmto
Grant ExParte
domestic
violenceor
abusehasoccurred
ascourtconsiders
necessary
to protect
the P andallparties
namedto be
protected
in the petit

Definitionof
Abuse/Violence

aggrassault, assault,
crim homicide,
harassment,
telephone
harassment,
kidnapping,
mayhem,
sex offensesstalking,
unlawfuldetention,
violof protecorder,
offenseagainst prop,
possessof deadly
weaponwith intentto
assault,discharge of
firearmin dir of
personor near
road/bldg,disorderly
conduct
any act involving
violence, forceor
threat inclforceful
detentionwhich
resultsin bod injor
placesonein
apprehension
of bod
inj

warrantfor violof
issuedandprobable
dangerof furtheracts
of fam abuseOR
groundsto belief that
R hascommittedtam
abuseandthere is
probabledangerof
furthersuchoffense
anyperson
court,
petitionfor
ex parte
specific factorsand irreparableinjury
phys harm,bodinj,
dependson relief
temporary
circumstances
from could resultfromDV if assault or infliction of
nature of
accompanied order of
whichreliefissought an orderis notissued fear of imminentphys
order
by affidavit
protection
immedw/out prior
harm,bod injor
underoath
notice to Resp.**
assault, sexual
Irrepinjuryincludes assault, stalking
sits in whichResphas
recentlythreat petit
withviol or has
engagedin actof DV
against petit
victim,adult
circuitcourts, verifiedpetition emergency certifyattemptto
Clear and convincing attempting
to causeor
tammem.,very tamcourts,
protective notifyRespmadeor evidenceof
know,intenor reck
detailedlistof magistrate
orderissued just causewhy
immediateand
causingphysharmto
relationships courts
ex parle
noticeshouldnotbe presentdangerof
another,placing
required.Also,
required
abuseto petitor minor anotherin apprehof
personwho
children
physharm,creating
reportedorwas
fear of physharm by
witnessto DA
harassment,
psych.
andhasbeen
abuseor threatening
abused,
acts,sexassault or
threatened
or
abuse,
holding
harassed
confining, detaining
another againstthat
person's will
familyor
judge or
petition
temporary alleg facts thatresp groundsto believe
intentionalinfliction of
household
familycourt
restraining engagedin or based thatresphas engagedphyspain,phys injury
member
who
commissioner
order
on priorconductDA in DAof pet.
or illness, intentional
hasbeen
of petitioner
impairment
of phys
abused
condition
victimabused courtwith
in writing,
emergency uniformform
emergency
orderby personto
jurisdiction
verified
orderissued
maybe issuedwhen
whomrelated overdomestic subscribed to ex parle.
LEOstates to court
bybloodor
relations
minmanner Orderfor
petis in needdanger
marriage)
or
(courthandlesprovidedby
protection
of DVor family
parentor
cases
statelaw)
issuedex
violence,basedon
guardian on
constructing
pane
alleg of recent
behalfof minor family rights
incident of DVor FV.
and respafter
OrderforProtection
separation/dis
whencourt deems
solution) note
necessary
to protect
recthat
the petitioner
emergency
ordersbe
granted
by
othercourt
,ersonnefl!

2008]

TA YLOR: EX PARTE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ORDERS

Natureof Relief
Granted Ex Parte :
is it morelimited
thana regular OP?
relieflimited- no
visitation

Ex Part OP
Expiration Date

Emergency
Order:
relieflimited

expires72 hours
afterissuanceor
extended to next
business day.

relieflimited

effective for 14
daysor 24 daysif
service by
publication

no difference- note
thatstatecontains
mandatory
provisions
for
protectiveorderand
permissive
provisions

ex parteOP
remainsin effect
untilservice is
completed.

Post Deprivation Length of ime
Hearing
TROis in Effect/
Available?
Opportunityor
Earlier Hearing?
respmayseek to courtshallset
vacateby filing hearing win 20
verifiedmotion.2 days afterorder
daysnotice to pet issued
required

Sanctions for Other?
False
Petition?

Sol

knowing
falsification of
any stint or
informay
subject petit to
felony
prosecution

crm andcivil
actions avail,
Petitioner
chooses

courtmaynot
deny pet relief
requested
becauseof
lapseof time
betwact of DV
or abuseand
filingpetition
for OP

o

mandates
court
provide
assistance to
victims,
Contractwith
privateagency
or organiz.

courtshall not
denreliefrelief
requested
solely because
of lapse of time
between actof
DVor FVand
filingpetition.

eitherprymayat
anytimefile a
writtenmotionreq
hearing to
dissolve or modify
order. Such
hearings
to be
givenprecedence
on docket.
notstated

petitor respmay
requestfinal
hearingw/in5
days ofdelivery to
petitor serviceon
resp. Hearing
mustbe
scheduled w/in 10
days. It hearing
reqafter 5 days,
then heardon
expedited
basis.

relieflimited

reliefin emergency emergency
order
order= usual +
expiresin 72 hours.
possession
anduse Orderfor protection
of autoother pers effective until
effects,granttemp furthernoticeof the
custody to petitioner. court. Upon
Reliefin orderfor
requestof either
protection=same.
party,w/in 30 days
Musthavehearingto of service.
grant visitation, atty
fees,make
rent/mortgage
payments,reimburse
expenses

if magistrate
issues order,
hearing mustbe
held in 10 days

hearingwin 7
days afterissue,
unless extended

